# Turkey PIC – CP Gripe – UTNIF 2022

# 1NC

## Top-level (Must-read)– 1NC

### Turkey PIC – 1NC

#### The United States Federal Government should increase its security cooperation with

Albania

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Montenegro

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

United Kingdom

#### in [insert plan language].

#### US and EU solve without Turkey

Hamilton 22, Daniel S. Hamilton,  Co-leads the Johns Hopkins University SAIS postdoctoral program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order,” President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, Founding Director of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, served as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies, Director of the Atlantic Basin Initiative, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, served as U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, served as Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs and Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. Embassy in Germany, “Promoting U.S.-EU Coordination and Cooperation on Technology Standards: Recommendations for Action”, 2022, [https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TTC-tech-standards-January-2021.pdf //](https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TTC-tech-standards-January-2021.pdf%20//) AB

International technical standards define the technological frontier. Those who determine the standards are those who shape the competition. Technical standard-setting in critical and emerging technologies also have direct bearing on key U.S. and EU foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights and democracy, and on their foreign economic and trade policies.2 In the past, the United States and Europe have largely been the world’s standard-makers. However, in a new world of disruptive innovation and diffuse power, they could quickly become standard-takers – unless they can leverage their mutual strengths to set the global regulatory framework for the standards of the future. In this context, the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) takes on strategic importance.

Global technical standards are established in various ways. A de facto standard can be developed by a first- mover company and then accepted more broadly. Size also matters; users tend to flock to the biggest providers and use the standards they create.3 Formal standards are adopted through industrial consortia and global standard development organizations (SDOs), such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Once standards are locked-in, they tend to remain rather durable, since changing them can be very costly.4

The United States and Europe are accustomed to being global standard-setters. Each boasts innovative companies that define many of the world’s technical standards. Through mutual investment and R&D links, those companies’ operations are deeply integrated across the transatlantic space. The $6.3 trillion transatlantic economy is also massive; aligned or interoperable standards across this vast market would generate economies of scale in some critical sectors that could largely determine global standards. European and U.S. firms remain the most influential participants in SDOs due to their leadership and their technical expertise, in-depth knowledge of standards-setting processes and rules, the quality of their contributions, and their continuous participation over time.5 Traditionally, both parties have been strongly represented in global standardization organizations, although U.S. participation has lagged of late. Both agree that international standards for emerging technologies should be developed in accordance with core principles established by the WTO, and as affirmed by the G7 and the G20. If the United States and the EU can use the TTC to harness these complementarities, they are in a good position to define the technological frontier.

## Kickout NB – 1NC

### Kickout – L – 1NC

#### The counterplan solves – Turkey materially breached Article 60 – cooperation with all other members is justified and ensures deterrence

Sari 19 (Dr. Aurel Sari, an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter and the Director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent,” Just Security, October 15, 2019, <https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/>, WC)

These passages confirm that maintaining and furthering the principles on which the Alliance is based — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — forms part of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. This, in turn, suggests that a failure to comply with these principles may amount to a material breach of the treaty within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Pursuant to Article 60, a material breach consists of:

(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or

(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.

To constitute a material breach pursuant to sub-paragraph (a), the violation of the principles underlying the treaty would have to be so extensive in scope, so severe and so persistent as to effectively “disavow” or repudiate the treaty (cf. Namibia Advisory Opinion, para. 95). Turning to sub-paragraph (b), there can be little doubt that continued compliance with the values set out in the preamble and Article 2 is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty.

Official statements issued by the member states, including at the Brussels Summit in 2018 and more recently on the occasion of NATO’s 70th Anniversary, repeatedly affirm these principles. A member nation that violated them in a systematic and egregious manner would thus cast doubt on the very resolve of the allies to “unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security” (preamble, North Atlantic Treaty).

Should the conditions for the existence of a material breach be satisfied, NATO’s member states would be entitled, by unanimous agreement, to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either in their relations with the defaulting state or among them all (Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention). For these purposes, a unanimous decision of the North Atlantic Council, excluding the defaulting state, would suffice. No further procedural requirements apply, including those laid down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention.

Whether or not Turkey is in material breach of its commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty is therefore a question to be determined by the other members of the Council. As Klaus Kress has observed, there is a “very serious possibility that Operation ‘Peace Spring’ could constitute a manifest violation of the prohibition of the use of force.” Coupled with President Erdoğan’s threat to “open the gates” for Syrian refugees to migrate to Europe, a threat fundamentally at odds with the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, characterizing these developments as a material breach is not entirely far-fetched.

In any event, they entitle other NATO nations to suspend or scale back their military cooperation with Turkey, even without declaring Turkey to be in material breach. Although Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, this obligation is meant to pursue the objectives of the treaty. The duty to develop military capabilities and to cooperate to this end therefore does not override the commitment to further the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. A number of Allies, including France, Germany and Norway, as well as official NATO partner Finland, are reported to have suspended the sale of military equipment to Turkey.

Overall, the absence of a suspension and expulsion mechanism in the North Atlantic Treaty does not prevent the North Atlantic Council from suspending or terminating the membership of an ally found to be in material breach of the treaty. However, with the 70th anniversary of the treaty just past, this is a sorry position for the Council to be in by any measure. Suspending, let alone terminating, a nation’s membership of NATO would be an extreme measure to be contemplated only once other attempts to restore unity and respect for the Alliance’s founding principles have been exhausted.

### Entrapment – ! – Kickout – 1NC

#### Expulsion avoids NATO entrapment in Turkish aggression vs Russia and Iran

GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB

Ousting Turkey: The Benefits

These multiple divergences between Turkey and its Western allies cast doubt on the validity of Ankara’s ongoing membership in NATO. Despite its official stance, Ankara has proven resistant when called to intervene in defense of the Organization’s common interest; however, it has not hesitated to pursue its own objectives, even when this meant contravening the NATO line. Turkey often behaves like an unreliable and ambivalent partner, and its participation in the Alliance creates more problems than benefits:

First, any attack on Turkish territory would be considered an attack against all members, which would leave the Alliance facing the dilemma of either being involved in a war or losing the credibility of its collective security guarantee. While an attack from Russia is a calculated risk since NATO mainly exists to deter this scenario, it is also true that Turkey’s occasional recklessness – such as the downing of a Russian military aircraft in 2015 – could lead to an escalation with unforeseeable consequences. Yet Ankara can pursue its assertive policy largely because it is part of the Alliance, meaning that it exposes the collectivity to useless risks for its own benefit. In addition, Russia is not the only potential antagonist: any standoff between Turkey and Iran could produce the same effects. At present, Turkey’s improving relations with both powers would seem to exclude the possibility, but it cannot be ruled out in the future.

#### Entrapment risks outweigh any benefits

Saleh 20- Researcher, Political analyst , US foreign policy , Syria conflict, Kurds affairs and the Middle East issues.(John Saleh, “Turkey’s Authoritarian Policy on NATO Principles,” Modern Diplomacy, July 22 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/22/turkeys-authoritarian-policy-on-nato-principles/)//mcu

Protecting Europe from any further expansion of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and interference was the main argument for expanding NATO membership, to include Turkey in 1952. Turkey, in turn, sought to be part of the European club and approached the West. That is why the US military presence in Turkey with conventional and nuclear forces was against the Soviet threat as well as against the potential effects of instability and conflicts in the Middle East. Where the strategic interests of the allies always dominate relations between Turkey and NATO, during and after the Cold War. That is why Turkey was under the protection of NATO and its supply of advanced weapons. Turkey is an important member of NATO because of its strategic location between East and West, and its control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles to prevent Russia from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Also hosting the Turkish Incirlik base for the American forces and the Patriot missiles, Turkey’s contribution to NATO with its soldiers in Kosovo and Afghanistan and supporting NATO’s military and financial tasks. That is why Erdogan takes advantage of all this to use him in his despotic policies and practices that are angering NATO countries and increasing their division. The preamble to the 1949 NATO Treaty states that NATO members are “determined to protect the freedom, shared heritage, and civilization of their people, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law.” That is why the member states of NATO are very concerned about the changes taking place in Turkey, but nonetheless NATO seeks to preserve the relationship with Turkey and not leave the alliance. **This policy towards Turkey tarnishes the alliance’s image and mission, weakens democracy and the rule of law, and** further weakens the alliance. It contributes to encouraging Erdogan to escalate his influence by supporting extremist Islamic movements, ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra Movement, and thus the terrorism industry in the Middle East, and its export to Europe. So, they should deal Turkey practices as a “frenemy” and adopt the term that has been applied to Pakistan. As a result, if NATO remains silent toward Erdogan’s authoritarian policies, which are hostile to liberal and democratic values, and his cooperation with Iran and Russia, we will find NATO implicated and responsible for Turkey’s crimes, where war crimes inside Syria and ethnic cleansing of the Kurds, as well as its interference in Libya. This will send NATO into wars to defend a member of the alliance**. This will bring disaster, instability and the possibility of Iran and Russia affecting NATO’s security and military affairs through their relations and strategic cooperation with Turkey.**

## No Kickout NB – 1NC

### Admonishment – No Kickout – L – 1NC

#### Treating Turkey as a normal ally is bad

Kardaş 19 (Şaban Kardaş, Professor of International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Techology. Uncertainty, Power, and Rethinking Turkish-U.S. Relations after S-400 Debacle, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019, Pg. 1-5 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21246.pdf>) – ED

Turkey’s determination to move ahead with the procurement of the Russian S-400 missile-defense system at the risk of sanctions by the United States has revived the debate on the future of its relations with its long-term ally. There has been a flourishing array of views on how things got to this point and where they might be heading. While much responsibility is put on Turkey’s unyielding strategic choices, the United States is also complicit for its inability to handle the relationship. Moving beyond the blame game, Nicholas Danforth identifies two broad narratives to explain Turkish conduct: “frustration” with an insensitive ally and “fear” from the threatening actions of an adversarial power. These two narratives correlate with the levels-of- analysis framework academics use to explain state behavior. In it, different factors at the individual, state, or systemic levels account for why states act the way they do, including forming alliances. Danforth’s “frustration” narrative is grounded in a state or systemic level of analysis, whereas the “fear” one relates mainly to the individual level of analysis. Until the recent delivery of components of the Russian weapons platform in Turkey, system- and state-level analyses prevailed in evaluations of the unfolding crisis. Many in Turkey and abroad had assumed that by opening new channels of communication the United States would convince, if not pressure, Turkish decision-makers to make a last-minute deal and change course. In addition to various mutual visits by official delegations, for instance, Senator Lindsay Graham and other lawmakers met President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss issues affecting the Turkish-U.S. relationship. But this did not suffice to affect the outcome. President Erdoğan, having emphasized on many occasions his promises to his Russian counterpart, showed his strong conviction to go ahead with a “done deal” despite pressure to change course. Moreover, he stressed his unease with Turkey’s Western partners especially after failed coup attempt of 2016. In that respect, taking delivery of the S-400s turned out to be a counterintuitive move by Turkey, reflecting how individual-level considerations can shape state behavior and override systemic imperatives. Perhaps what enabled the individual-level—or “fear”— factor to carry the day in Turkish decision-making is its coalescence with the system-level—or “frustration”— factor. Systemic transformations weakened the fundamentals of the Turkish-U.S. alliance and created an environment within which a new thinking came to dominate Turkey’s external conduct. Since the structural causes of divergence were already there, it is no surprise to see the “frustration” argument being widely embraced in Turkey to justify the S-400 decision. What is striking, however, is that it is not only adopted by the bureaucracy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by moderate commentators, as suggested by Danforth, but also by the major opposition parties. For instance, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reacted to the pressure by the U.S. Congress on President Donald Trump to impose sanctions by arguing that the risks posed by Turkey’s geography justified the S-400 purchase. What Went Wrong? The root causes of the divergence between Turkey and the United States long predate the S-400 saga. They foreshadowed the fracturing of the relationship throughout the Syrian crisis, which many analysts mistakenly treated as the main trigger for the strategic decoupling by the two allies. At least for a decade now, the Turkish-U.S. relationship has required a proper redefinition, if not a new guiding framework. There was no scarcity of calls for this to happen either. For example, I argued in 2010 that “It might be time for the United States to abandon the search for redefining the relationship [with Turkey] on ‘partnership’ models.” The sea change in the relationship is the product of various factors. Harboring a regionally driven understanding of international relations in the post- Cold War era, Turkey has opted to base its external conduct on the quest for strategic autonomy. Likewise, a desire to adjust to global power transitions has lurked in the background. In its strategic thinking, especially with the AK Party at the helm, Turkey already lives in a world of multipolarity and seeks flexibility when it comes to alliance choices. Moreover, a deliberate attempt to challenge the power asymmetry inherent in the relationship with the United States shapes the worldview of Turkey’s current leadership. Consequently, every foreign policy issue has been framed as yet another battleground for correcting the “unequal” and “unfair” treatment by the United States and for breaking the dependence on Turkey’s senior partner. Furthermore, the cycle of insecurity following the Arab Spring of 2011 overwhelmed Turkey’s strategic thinking to such an extent that concerns for state and regime survival came to the forefront. The fragmentation of states and collapse of central authority in the region posed direct challenges to Turkey, and a concern to prevent spillover effects came to dominate its thinking. Last but not the least, the reconfiguration of Turkey’s domestic political scene—in terms of governance model and body politic—under the pressures of the post-Arab Spring regional turmoil brought about a new political culture, altering the normative fabric and personal dimensions of the relationship with the United States. In particular, the redesign of the domestic political system into a presidential one and the reconfiguration of the governing bloc with the alliance between the AK Party and the Nationalist Action Party to cater to the needs of the ruling elite precipitated a search for new external allies and weakened the traditional domestic pillars and constituencies of the alliance with the United States. Uncertainty, Leadership, and Alliances in a Post-U.S. World Largely ignored in the debate in the United States on “who lost Turkey” is the question of how the S-400 crisis relates to the wider debate on the role of “ What allies such as Turkey see is a deep structural uncertainty about the grand strategy of the United States and its inability to make credible commitments. alliances in today’s international system. What has been fundamentally altered in the post-Cold War era is not just the foundations of the Turkish-U.S. relationship, but the very meaning and mechanics of alliance behavior. Amid the endless arguments about retrenchment, rebalancing, offshore balancing, the decline of U.S. primacy, liberal internationalism, and patriotism, what U.S. allies such as Turkey see is a deep structural uncertainty about the grand strategy of the United States and its inability to make credible commitments. It is no secret that the United States had no easy ride in building or maintaining alliances in the unipolar era. Likewise, it has been far from perfect in exercising constructive and cooperative leadership that satisfies the needs of its allies. These two problems have been aggravated as the United States had to find ingenious ways to deal with allies that are less willing to abide a top-down partnership model. Perhaps equally problematic has been Washington’s handling of adversaries. It has failed to exercise its power to change the behavior of these through a mix of rewards or punishment. As has been demonstrated repeatedly, U.S. power has not automatically yielded the outcomes desired. For example, the inability of the United States to counter Russia’s assertiveness since the war in Georgia in 2008, despite threats and sanctions, and to build a coalition to contain it has been noted by its allies and adversaries alike. Reacting to U.S Power There have been at least two distinct reactions by second-tier powers like Turkey to the travails of U.S. preponderance. First, uncertainty has bred frustration as many still expect the United States to exercise leadership of some sort. Its failure to offer a shared vision to allies, let alone signaling its strategic priorities in a post-U.S. world, forces many of them to look for ways to guard their interests through unilateral action or strategies of hedging. Second, many countries still view the United States as too powerful despite the erosion of unipolarity. At least since the 2003 Iraq War, scholars like Stephen Walt have warned about the potential dangers involved in untamed exercise of U.S. power. Since then the United States’ allies and adversaries alike have engaged in acts of “soft balancing”—that is, actions “that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies”. The accumulation of such practices arguably precipitates counterbalancing behavior on the part of second-tier powers, including building alliances with like-minded countries. Turkey’s S-400 decision has elements of both factors, which is nicely captured in the “fear and frustration” analogy. Its developing strategic relationship with Russia serves as a hedge against “the United States as an unreliable ally” and as a counterbalancing tool against “the United States as a threatening adversary.” It further illustrates how alignment behavior is driven by leaders’ attributes, including their worldviews and survival calculations as much as national strategic considerations. Turkey’s decision to forge closer ties with Russia cannot be fully explained without taking into account how perceptions of threat at the individual level can come to dominate decision- making. As for the United States, it has watched—if not allowed—the sea change in Turkey happen without undertaking preemptive steps to address the root causes of the flourishing Turkish-Russian relationship. Instead, in Washington’s lexicon, Turkey has gone from being an “intrinsically strategically important ally” to “too strategically important to be lost to the other side.” But even the latter view, which has kept many frictions from escalating, no longer holds as Turkey increasingly has become the subject of punitive language and sanctions. The country’s slide further toward the status of “dispensable ally” raises intriguing questions. Going beyond the political turmoil surrounding the Trump administration in Washington, there probably is a systemic logic behind the ease with which the United States has downgraded Turkey’s status. It may be part of a deliberate policy of rebalancing global U.S. commitments, rather than the mishandling of the relationship. The Way Forward There seems to be a deep belief in Turkey that the onus of mending ties lies with the United States. Just as the country’s leadership has insistently advocated in the S-400 crisis, it expects the United States to understand Turkey’s concerns and to act accordingly. In moving beyond the crisis, the thinking in Ankara will continue to challenge the inequality inherent in the very nature of the transatlantic alliance and remain bent on reconfiguring the relationship on a new notion of alliance. It is far from certain, however, the United States is ready to revise its cognitive map to accommodate Turkish concerns in a new structured partnership model. As I have argued before, this would “connote long-term commitments and cooperative behavior on the part of Turkey that might prove impossible to sustain. Instead, both parties might consider letting the relationship evolve on an ad hoc basis involving The United States has to find ways to address the structural uncertainty about its grand strategy, which, if unattended, may breed more distrust in Turkey. different degrees of cooperation and competition as interests overlap or diverge.” Moreover, at this stage, the problem may not lie so much in the lack of dialogue as much as in the incompatibility of strategic visions. Perhaps it would be better for both countries to brace themselves for a continued volatile period in their relations. Nonetheless, the United States still has to find ways to address the structural uncertainty about its grand strategy, which, if unattended, may breed more distrust in Turkey. It has to continue looking for ways to exercise its power more judiciously, as this remains a major prism for how others define their relations with it. Otherwise, the United States risks not only the decades-old alliance relationship with Turkey but also alliance solidarity in NATO.

#### That kills NATO and EU credibility

**Kogan 18** (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. http://gpf-europe.com/upload/esd\_02-2018-2-30-32\_kogan.pdf) – ED

The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY  restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.

### NATO Cred – ! – No Kickout – 1NC

#### NATO credibility is key to deter Russia

Veebel and Ploom 18 (Vijar Veebel, Baltic Defense College. Illimar Ploom, Estonian National Defense College. The Deterrence Credibility of NATO and the Readiness of the Baltic States to Employ the Deterrence Instruments, Sciendo, December 2018, Pg. 199-200 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330315297_The_Deterrence_Credibility_of_NATO_and_the_Readiness_of_the_Baltic_States_to_Employ_the_Deterrence_Instruments>) – ED

Last but not least, the Alliance could also make some significant efforts to increase the credibility of its strategy of deterrence. For example, it is obvious that Russia is not underestimating the role of explicit strategic communication in determining the outcome of the conflict. The tactic of the Kremlin is to mobilize people using emotional arguments (more or less “we are under attack and everybody wants to destroy us”). The same approach would most likely not work in the case of the Alliance, because NATO is highly unlikely to be able and willing to emotionally mobilise and oppose itself to Russia. This is due to the differences among the NATO member states in the way they see Rus- sia’s ambitions and actions in the current security environment. An alternative option for NATO to increase the credibility of its political statements – which would also mean an increase to the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence stra- tegy – would be to rely on rational arguments whereby it explains, in a simple manner, why it would be easier and cheaper for NATO to defend the Baltic countries in comparison to what it would take to liberate them.

### EU Cred – ! – No Kickout – 1NC

#### EU credibility key for countries to agree to the European Green Deal, which is key to solve CC

Harvey et. al. 19 (Fiona Harvey, award-winning environmental journalist. Jennifer Rankin. Daniel Boffey. European Green Deal will change economy to solve climate crisis, says EU. The Guardian. 12/11/19, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/11/european-green-deal-will-change-economy-to-solve-climate-crisis-says-eu>) – ED

Nearly every major aspect of the European economy is to be re-evaluated in light of the imperatives of the climate and ecological emergency, according to sweeping new plans set out by the European commission on Wednesday. The comprehensive nature of the European Green Deal – which encompasses the air we breathe to how food is grown, from how we travel to the buildings we inhabit – was set out in a flurry of documents as Ursula von der Leyen, the new commission president, made her appeal to member states and parliamentarians in Brussels to back the proposals, which would represent the biggest overhaul of policy since the foundation of the modern EU. Von der Leyen said the package was aimed at economic growth and increasing prosperity. “[This] is our new growth strategy, for a growth that gives back more than it takes away,” she said. “It shows how to transform our way of living and working, of producing and consuming, so that we live healthier [lives] and make our businesses innovate. We will help our economy to be a global leader by moving first and moving fast.” Europe must lead on the climate crisis. The European Green Deal shows how Ursula von der Leyen Read more As well as bidding to lead the world on climate action with a proposed target of net-zero carbon by 2050 and halving emissions by 2030, the EU will delve far more deeply into the root problems that contribute to carbon emissions and pollution. For instance, in manufacturing: in previous decades, the EU was content to set targets for recycling rates; under the European Green Deal, regulators would set specific standards on the manufacturing of goods to create a circular economy and phase out unnecessary plastic and other waste before it is created. From 2021, at least 40% of the budget for the common agricultural policy and 30% of fisheries subsidies would be devoted to tackling climate change and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, instead of contributing to higher emissions and environmental degradation, as many of these subsidies do at present. Toxic air and its health impacts would be tackled through tougher air quality requirements, and energy targets would be raised to generate more energy from renewable sources, up to 100% by 2050. More freight would be transported by rail and water, and greenhouse gas emissions from air travel would be reduced. The emissions reduction target for 2030 was proposed at a level of 50-55%, with a new law enshrining the commitment to net zero carbon for 2050. As an inducement to the member states reluctant to sign up to the 2030 and 2050 targets – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – Von der Leyen promised€100bn (£84bn) to help finance the transition to a low-carbon economy, along with the potential for a carbon border tax to be levied on imports to the EU from countries without sufficiently stringent carbon targets of their own. Leaders will discuss the emissions goals when they meet in Brussels at a summit on Thursday, but agreement still appears some way off. Failure to agree a second time, following a previous attempt in June, would be a blow to the EU’s standing at the UN climate talks, now reaching their final days in Madrid. One senior EU official said: “One of the elements that the heads of state and government will have to take into account is the pressure outside the room on this. This is climate week, right. So there might be a deal, there might not be a deal.” The commission will also face a difficult task in gaining full backing for the rest of the package among all member states. As well as those concerned about the carbon targets, there are the powerful agricultural and fishing lobbies in several states with concerns over reforms to the subsidy regime, and industries such as car manufacturing and chemicals that will face new regulations In one indication of the troubles yet to come, the UK on Wednesday joined the Czech Republic and France in blocking a deal on a set of rules governing which financial products can be labelled “green” and “sustainable”. France was concerned that its nuclear industry would lose out from the “taxonomy for sustainable finance”. Negotiations among member states and the European parliament on the green financing proposals are expected to resume on Monday. EU's soaring climate rhetoric not always matched by action Green campaigners welcomed the aims of the European Green Deal but called for more detail and higher ambition, including a strengthening of the emissions target to a 65% cut by 2030. Franziska Achterberg, EU spokesperson for Greenpeace, said: “The climate targets [the commission is] proposing would be too little too late. On protecting nature, much is aspirational and needs to be fleshed out. The detailed measures that will follow must tackle the production and consumption patterns that have brought us to the brink.” Some campaigners at the UN climate talks in Madrid also called for the EU to bring forward its international proposals faster, to give more momentum to the push for tougher carbon targets under the Paris agreement. Under the commission’s proposals, the plans could not be formally adopted until next summer, giving only a few months before the crunch 2020 climate conference in Glasgow. Wendel Trio of the Climate Action Network said: “Timing is everything. Now EU member states have a big responsibility to agree on a much higher 2030 climate target at the European Council in June 2020.” “The proposed package is comprehensive, identifying the right areas for action – from biodiversity and nature restoration to climate change and stopping deforestation,” said Ester Asin, director of the European policy office at WWF. “However, by emphasising continued economic growth as a key objective, the commission has missed an opportunity to challenge the traditional growth paradigm in favour of an approach that would respect planetary boundaries.”

# Block

## Competition – 2NC

### AT: Perm Do Both

#### The permutation includes Turkey. That links to the net benefit.

### AT Perm Do CP---“The”

#### The means all. NOT some or any.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 (“Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC”, No. 14-3836, May 8)

Special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the definition in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 1, restricts the court's interpretation of that language. The word "the" frequently (but not always) indicates a particular thing. It can also be used to refer to something generically, as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question--which could be the (Ohio) Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction--that it refers to a specific thing--all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs interpretation of texts.

## Kickout – NB – 2NC

### Turkey Leaving NATO – Brink – UQ – 2NC

#### Turkey is on the brink of leaving NATO

Sari 19, Aurel Sari, Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter, director of the Exeter Centre for International Law, a Fellow of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, a Fellow of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, “Can Turkey be Expelled from NATO? It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not Politically Prudent”, 10/15/19, <https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-expelled-from-nato/> //AB

Turkey’s ongoing military action in Syria, Operation Peace Spring, has caused consternation and dismay among its allies. French President [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.france24.com/en/20191013-macron-merkel-call-for-end-to-turkish-offensive-in-syria)warned that the intervention could create an “unbearable humanitarian situation” and demanded that the offensive should cease. In a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, German Chancellor [Angela Merkel](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzlerin-merkel-telefoniert-mit-dem-tuerkischen-staatspraesidenten-recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9Fan-1680978) called for an immediate end to military operations. British Prime Minister [Boris Johnson](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-president-trump-9-october-2019) and U.S. President Donald Trump expressed their serious concern over Turkey’s action and the risk of a humanitarian catastrophe in the region.

Others have gone further. Writing shortly before Operation Peace Spring commenced, U.S. Senator [Lindsey Graham](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/464649-graham-van-hollen-pledge-bipartisan-sanctions-on-turkey-if-they-attack-kurds) promised to “introduce bipartisan sanctions against Turkey if they invade Syria” and to “call for their suspension from NATO if they attack Kurdish forces who assisted the U.S. in the destruction of the ISIS Caliphate.” Echoing these sentiments, Representative [Eliot L. Engel](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YpkWpJZT1M), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested that the United States should consider kicking Turkey out of NATO. On Oct 13, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper [revealed](https://www.foxnews.com/category/shows/fox-news-sunday) that he [warned Turkey](https://twitter.com/rgoodlaw/status/1183399118326190080?s=20) in advance of its incursion that if it were to proceed with the operation, this would “damage U.S. relations with Turkey, their staying in NATO.”

We are not in unchartered territory. Demands to suspend Turkey’s membership in NATO, or to expel it from the Alliance altogether, have been made before, including in response to the [political crackdown](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/19/erdogans-purge-may-give-nato-no-choice-but-to-expel-turkey-from/) of 2016 and its decision to acquire the [Russian S-400 air defence system](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jul/17/throw-turkey-out-nato/).

### L---CP Leads to Turkish Expulsion

#### The counterplan signifies Turkey is no longer wanted as a NATO ally. That solves, even without a treaty-exit provision

Shipley 21, senior editor @ Bloomberg responsible for the editorial page (David, “Biden Should Cut the Gordian Knot With Turkey,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-13/biden-should-cut-turkey-loose-from-the-west#xj4y7vzkg)//BB>

Turkey has long since abandoned the West. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has aligned his country with an axis of powers openly hostile to Western interests: China, Russia and Iran. This is his prerogative as a popular, elected leader. But Erdogan also craves the protection of the West’s military partnerships and membership in its economic associations. He wants Turkey to remain within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization even as he buys weapons systems that undermine the alliance’s security and hurls insults at heads of member states. And he seeks “mutual trust” with the European Union even as he threatens to flood it with millions of migrants. The West should respond by demonstrating that its tolerance for Turkish truculence is at an end. The best forum to do so is NATO, where patience for Erdogan is already wearing thin. The alliance’s first summit since President Joe Biden’s swearing-in takes place next week, and he is scheduled to meet Erdogan on June 14. Erdogan has deployed especially bellicose oratory against the U.S. Such hostility was met with amused tolerance by President Donald Trump, who showed little interest in American leadership. Now that Biden has said he will resume that responsibility, he should make it clear to Erdogan that Turkey can’t have it both ways. Biden has had plenty of opportunities to size Erdogan up over the years, and he has clearly concluded that the Turkish leader is an autocrat. Turkey, he has said, has “got to understand that we’re not going to continue to play with them the way we have.” Turkey is already testing this assertion by ratcheting up the rhetoric. Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu has openly accused the U.S. of ordering a failed 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan, and claimed Europe was enthusiastic in its support. This goes well beyond previous accusations, some aired by Erdogan himself, that the U.S. had sided with the coup plotters. In fact, Biden was vice president at the time of the coup attempt, and flew to Turkey to assure Erdogan of American support. Although Ankara has conducted exhaustive investigations into the events, and arrested thousands of people, it has not provided a shred of evidence that the U.S. or Europe were in any way involved. Yet Erdogan hasn’t thought to correct his minister’s charges, much less chastise him. As for NATO, Turkey has brushed aside its repeated warnings against acquiring Russian missile-defense systems, and is in fact proposing to buy even more. It has ratcheted up disputes with alliance members Greece (over hydrocarbon exploration) and France (over the Libyan civil war). More recently, it used its membership to further Moscow’s agenda by insisting that NATO water down its criticism of Belarus for the forced landing of an airliner and seizure of a dissident on board. NATO’s founding charter doesn’t allow for members to be expelled, but Turkey can be told in various ways that it’s no longer wanted as a member. A good start would be to reduce the alliance’s footprint on Turkish soil, starting with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and other strategic assets. The group can also coordinate punitive measures against Turkey, including the suspension of arms sales and economic sanctions. The European Union should underline the message by confirming it has no intention of reviving the long-stalled talks over Turkey’s accession. Biden could back NATO with unilateral American measures. His administration has already indicated it may extend sanctions on Turkey’s defense industry and will uphold the country’s suspension from the F-35 fighter program. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said even tougher penalties would be considered. This would be welcomed by Congress, where a bipartisan consensus on punishing Turkey had been frustrated by Trump’s tendency to cut Erdogan ever more slack. The site where Alexander ran his sword through the Gordian knot is an hour’s drive from modern Ankara. Cutting Turkey loose from the West should be a more straightforward undertaking.

#### Implicitly identifying Turkey as in material breach ends Turkey’s membership in NATO either through Turkish withdrawal or formal exclusion. Key to Sweden and Finland membership.

Shackleford 6-2-2022, senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is author of “The Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.” (Elizabeth, “Elizabeth Shackelford: When it comes to Turkey, NATO needs to consider divorce,” *Chicago Tribune*, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-nato-alliance-turkey-divorce-shackelford-20220602-nyreivkfdndtpfivcepjnbv7xy-story.html)//BB>

Partnerships, among people and nations, have a wide range of possible meanings and scope. But alliances are formal agreements that indicate a specific kind of commitment, such as marriage. An alliance is a promise between nations to support and defend each other, in good times and bad, sickness and health, or more specifically, peace time or war.

Alliances shouldn’t be entered into casually, but they shouldn’t be unalterable either. If an alliance becomes an obstacle to a nation’s ability to secure its needs, the standards and path for getting out should be clear and reasonable. This brings me to Turkey. As any real friend to NATO would, I have to ask: is Turkey today really the Turkey you were drawn to as a partner 70 years ago? I fear you and Turkey have grown apart, most recently with its threat to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. I worry the growing differences are becoming irreconcilable. In the early NATO days, Turkey was sitting on the border of the Soviet Union. When stopping Soviet expansion was NATO’s primary purpose, Turkey’s geography might have been compelling enough to overcome other shortcomings. This was easy to do, too, given Turkey’s potential at the time. It seemed to be moving firmly toward a Western identity and embracing liberal, democratic values that NATO saw within itself. As often happens in relationships, that promise didn’t turn out, and Turkey saw coups and unrest in the coming decades. In 2002, the West thought this time could be different, with the democratic election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), but the commitment to democracy still wasn’t real, and Turkey took a hard turn toward illiberal, authoritarian rule. Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdogan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdogan is in it for what Erdogan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security. While they clash on several issues, Erdogan is still close to Putin, as he tries to play both sides. Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense systems in 2019 was a slap in NATO’s face and direct violation of U.S. sanctions. Can Turkey still be trusted with NATO’s weapons systems, or does Turkey’s snug relationship with Russia risk the compromise of classified NATO weapons system information? NATO, you can do better. Finland and Sweden are courting you, after all. Like Turkey, they have capable, professional militaries and strategic geography, but they also share your values, such as democracy and the rule of law. You’re not likely to catch Finland or Sweden imprisoning political opponents or threatening journalists. And Erdogan’s objection to the accession of Finland and Sweden raises the question of whose side Erdogan is on at all. Other NATO members have long tired of Turkey’s duplicity and games. This isn’t the first time booting Turkey out of the alliance has been a topic of debate. The possibility was raised after Erdogan’s harsh crackdown in 2016 following a failed coup attempt, as well after Turkey invaded northeastern Syria in 2019. But since NATO has no mechanism for suspending or expelling an ally, a path out isn’t clear. If the rest of the alliance finds that Turkey has consistently violated NATO principles, they can unanimously agree to withdraw Article 5 protections from Turkey, effectively suspending its participation and any assistance it receives from NATO. This is probably the closest to divorce it can get, but even this determination would require a clear-eyed assessment of the benefits Turkey brings to the table and the risks too. Perhaps Turkey would agree to a no-fault divorce — it can always choose to withdraw. If not, marriage counseling might be in order. No ally is the perfect ally, and no spouse the perfect spouse. Some manner of compromise and understanding is always necessary. It’s ultimately up to NATO to decide whether Turkey is worth the formal defense commitment, but it’s a decision they should feel empowered to make rather than accept the alliance as is. Periodically reconsidering the value and legitimacy of these commitments isn’t unreasonable. In fact, it’s one marker of a healthy relationship.

### Kickout Good – NATO Cred – ! – 2NC

#### Turkish expulsion is good --- prevents Russia/China infiltration AND re-establishes NATO as a liberal community

Williamson 5/22- a fellow at National Review Institute, the roving correspondent for National Review (KEVIN D. WILLIAMSON “It’s Time to Boot Turkey from NATO,” National Review, May 22, 2022, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/05/its-time-to-boot-turkey-from-nato/)//mcu>

We ought to do Turkish caudillo Recep Tayyip Erdogan the courtesy of being frank with him: A NATO that includes Sweden and Finland but excludes Turkey is preferable to one that includes Turkey but excludes Sweden and Finland. It is time for Turkey to go. As Russian war criminals murder and rape their way through Ukraine, Russia’s long-suffering neighbor, Finland, has finally decided that it is time to formally join NATO. Sweden, though a larger and more powerful country (twice as big by population and by GDP), is following Finland’s lead and is ready to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, as well. Turkey, the odd man out in NATO, plans to veto any move to bring Finland and Sweden into the alliance. At least, that is the official position. Erdogan’s real agenda is something simpler: blackmail. Notionally, this is about the presence of a handful of Kurdish militants in Nordic exile. In reality, this is about the fact that Turkey under Erdogan has come to much more closely resemble Vladimir Putin’s Russia in its fundamental political character than it does any of its fellow NATO members. Turkey has developed close economic and political relations with Russia, and Erdogan has worked hard not to irritate Putin during the Ukraine war. Every political axis needs a third member, and Ankara today fits more easily between Moscow and Beijing than it does between Paris and Berlin. NATO is not only a military alliance. It is also a community of liberal-democratic values — values which Turkey rejects with increasing vigor and openness. The West once hoped — naively, as it turns out — that Erdogan would carry the banners of secularism, democracy, and liberty for the Turkish people, but he has led Turkey in the opposite direction: toward Islamist politics, authoritarianism, and tyranny. It is time to expel Turkey from NATO. This is a possibility that has been considered before. Erdogan’s brutal suppression of dissent beginning in 2016 and his cooperation with Moscow in acquiring Russian air-defense technology both led to calls for NATO to sever ties with Turkey. Booting Turkey out of NATO will be tricky on both the legal and political fronts, not least because the North Atlantic Treaty does not contain an explicit mechanism for expelling a member. The lawyers will no doubt dice it pretty fine if NATO members argue that Turkey is in material breach of its treaty obligations, but as a matter of fact Turkey is undermining NATO in the service of Erdogan’s domestic political needs**.** Turkey is advancing the interests of Moscow and Beijing and making it more difficult for NATO members to engage in collective self-defense, which is the point of NATO. And morally, Turkey does not deserve to be in NATO. NATO’s job is to defend its members against police states, not to provide a snug harbor in which authoritarianism may be cultivated. NATO’s neighboring bureaucracy in Brussels should also do Erdogan the courtesy of being frank and formally ending all consideration of Turkey as a candidate for membership in the European Union. Turkey was not a very good fit for the European Union at its best, and it is far from at its best today. Beyond its backsliding into soft dictatorship, Turkey is an economic basket case with 70 percent inflation and increasingly irresponsible economic policies. The European Union had a hard enough time with Greece’s financial shenanigans, and Greece is Denmark compared to Turkey. Geopolitics is not a matter of friendship. As Lord Palmerston put it (and here the full quotation is more illuminating than the apocryphal proverb attributed to Charles de Gaulle), “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” There was a time when it seemed that Turkey was fitted to NATO’s permanent interests. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, when the organization was not yet a decade old and Joseph Stalin was still extant, if only barely that. NATO’s optimism was perhaps excessive, but, at the time, Turkey identified itself very strongly with the West and looked westward toward its future. Today’s Turkey looks eastward, and that fact should be acknowledged. Things did not have to go this way, but Turkey has made its choices — not only the autocratic junta of Recep Tayyip Erdogan but the Turkish people, too. Perhaps that looks like a tragedy when seen from Brussels and like something else when seen from Ankara. But however we feel about them, the facts on the ground are what they are, and it is time for NATO to recognize this and act accordingly.

## No Kickout – NB – 2NC

### NATO-Turkey Relations – Brink – UQ

#### The US-Turkey partnership has reached its climax and tensions are high

Beyoghlow 20, Kamal Beyoghlow, Adjunct Associate Professor of Government at American University, “Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership”, USAWC Press, January 18th 2020, pg 1-5, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/63534> // GD

The US-Turkish strategic partnership established at the end of World War II reached its climax in the late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s relationship with other Western partners, especially NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time when it is facing a myriad of collective global security challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on the European continent. All is not lost, however, and with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can be salvaged.

States with long and deep commitments to one another seldom experience the kind of political and military distrust and uncertainties characterizing the current state of affairs between Turkey and its traditional Western allies, including the United States. Much of the ongoing tensions can be traced to the American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria, as well as to other fundamental strategic disagreements over how best to shape the future of the Greater Middle East and North Africa. Although some agencies within the US government have had differences with Turkey over the latter’s increasingly authoritarian bent, not all elements within the US government are in agreement with the reasons or path forward. No one factor can be attributed to the new authoritarian trend in Turkey. After all, the majority of the Turkish public, through elections and referendums, has given President Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) the mandate they need to rule and change the political rules of the game in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s deeply fragmented political system and its weak political parties have played a role in the changes in the nature and the character of Turkey’s political system from a military authoritarian one to a civilian authoritarian one.

From Turkey’s perspective, the United States and NATO have turned upside down the game plans of others in the region, chief among them Turkey’s ruling AKP and its leader, President Erdogan. Using some imagination, one can foresee the adverse impacts American operational and tactical moves have had on Turkey since the invasion of Iraq in 2003; and more recently, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. America’s sponsorship, training, and military support of the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic force in Syria—a compilation of predominantly Kurdish fighters and supporters affiliated with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD); its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG); and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), fighters which Turkey considers its most dangerous political and military nemeses—have strained US-Turkish relations and impacted Turkish public opinion of the United States in a negative way. Turkey views Western military and logistical support for Kurds in Syria and Iraq as inimical to its broader regional interest of containing Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and beyond and preventing the emergence of Syrian Kurdish enclaves close to its southeast borders, where the bulk of Turkish Kurds reside. Turkey’s long-term position on any autonomous or federated Kurdish enclaves in surrounding regional states could invite calls by Turkish Kurds for similar calls and encourage the PKK—a US designated terror organization—to continue carrying out cross-border attacks on Turkish institutions and territory.

Although there has been no indication so far that rules of engagement involving US military trainees and special forces units have changed as far as Turkey’s security along its southeastern frontier is concerned, the potential for serious clashes between the Turkish military and the Syrian Kurds has been growing following the fall of Raqqa, the seat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS’s) caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Since the summer of 2012, the Turkish media has frequently reported incidents of Turkish fighter jets and ground forces taking off from their bases to chase off Syrian Kurdish units operating too close 4 to Turkey’s border.1 Ankara-backed Syrian groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime have emerged as the main beneficiary of these rules of engagement, which have effectively served as a Turkish cover for the country’s military and logistical operations in border regions, especially since the fall of the Syrian town of Afrin and the expulsion of Kurdish fighters from there by Turkish troops and their Muslim Syrian Sunni fighter allies, including the Free Syrian Army, on March 18, 2018.

Anti-Americanism in Turkey appears to be increasing as the war in Syria continues unabated. These attitudes, if they persist, are likely to adversely affect the resiliency of the traditional partnership among the United States, Turkey, and NATO—especially the military-to-military relationship—including basing rights and other defense commitments enshrined in NATO’s declaration of principles. Turkey is already moving toward an uneasy strategic alliance with Russia and Iran to address the future of Syria and to diversify its logistical and military weapon purchases and ultimate dependency beyond NATO. The proposed Turkish purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia to compensate for Turkey’s gap in air defense capability and the consummation of a long-standing nuclear power deal following years of delicate negotiations between Russia and Turkey will most certainly have profound security implications for the United States, NATO, and the Middle Eastern and North African states. The S-400 acquisition by Turkey poses two problems for NATO: (1) a lack of interoperability with existing NATO platforms and (2) fear that increased military cooperation between Russia and Turkey could expose NATO platforms to Russian espionage activities, ultimately undermine Turkey’s resolve and commitment to NATO, and weaken the organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought to weaken NATO, which he considers an existential threat to his state.

#### Turkey disagrees with and disrupts NATO cooperation and decision-making

Ebrahim & Lawati 6/29 (Ebrahim and Lawai, both journalists and reporters for CNN, specializing in Middle East reporting, “How Erdogan’s Turkey became NATO’s wild card”, CNN, 6/30/22, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/middleeast/turkey-nato-erdogan-mime-intl/index.html)

Erdogan has disagreed with NATO allies on a number of issues, including Syria and Libya, and has used his country's strategic location to extract concessions from his European neighbors by threatening [to open the floodgates](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/10/politics/syria-turkey-offensive-displaced-intl-hnk/index.html) of refugees from neighboring conflict zones.

In 2009, Turkey [opposed the appointment](http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/04/03/nato.rasmussen/index.html) of Denmark's Anders Fogh Rasmussen as head of NATO until then-US President[Barack Obama pledged](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL4594859) that one of Rasmussen's deputies would be a Turk. Turkey had argued that Rasmussen's [handling of the offenses](http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/02/06/denmark.cartoons/index.html) to Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper in 2006 were problematic. In perhaps its boldest and most [controversial move](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/13/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-nato-analysis-intl/index.html), Turkey in 2019 bought the Russian S-400 missile defense system, calling into question a decades-long alliance with both the US and NATO. The S-400 missiles were designed to shoot down NATO planes. [Sinan Ulgen](https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/547), a former Turkish diplomat and chairman of Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM, said Erdogan's "hyper-centralized decision-making" and his "[combative, more aggressive](https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/11/europe/turkey-analysis-erdogan-intl/index.html), [and] less consensus-driven" leadership style has caused difficulties for NATO. "This is also a reflection of the increased unpredictability of [Turkish foreign policy](https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-politics-commentary-hakura/index.html)," he said. But experts say that it's only natural that a member of an alliance will prioritize national interests where it can. The problem arises when those interests diverge from NATO's agenda. "The Turks complicate NATO's consensus-based decision-making because they refuse to go with the flow until national interests are satisfied," said [Rich Outzen](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/richard-outzen/), a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and former US military officer and State Department official. "This is not bad alliance behavior; it is typical alliance behavior for states with the weight to pull it off," he added.

While Turkey understands its value to NATO, it also sees its own benefit in its membership, analysts say. Ankara has gone to NATO more than once for strategic security support, said Ulgen. "It is a security and political relationship that is mutually beneficial. "Ultimately Turkiye and NATO do need each other," he said, using the [country's new name](https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/03/middleeast/turkey-name-change-mime-intl/index.html).

#### Turkey has been making controversial decisions even in the NATO

Crowley and Erlanger, 22 (Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger- Diplomatic correspondent, Chief diplomatic correspondent, “For NATO, Turkey is a Disruptive Ally”, The New York Times, May 30, 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html)//IW

When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked. After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member. Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy. “These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.” It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory. The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine. But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016. He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support. An [opinion essay](https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-erdogans-turkey-belong-in-nato-sweden-finland-join-veto-weapons-peace-broker-11652882743?mod=hp_trending_now_opn_pos3) this month that was co-written by Joseph I. Lieberman, a former independent U.S. senator from Connecticut, argued that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey would flunk the alliance’s standards for democratic governance in prospective new member states. The essay, published by The Wall Street Journal, warned that Ankara’s policies, including a coziness with Mr. Putin, had undermined NATO’s interests and that the alliance should explore ways of ejecting Turkey. Some members of Congress have said as much. “Turkey under Erdogan should not and cannot be seen as an ally,” Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said after Turkey’s 2019 incursion into Syria. “Turkey has undermined its own image,” said Alper Coskun, a former Turkish diplomat who is now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. But, he added, “it is still a critical member of the alliance.” Some American analysts are skeptical. Eric S. Edelman, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Finland, warned that Mr. Erdogan could be seeking to curry favor with Mr. Putin — or at least ease the anger in Moscow over the sale of lethal drones to Ukraine’s military by a private Turkish company. Others believe the Turkish leader wants a payoff from Washington. Mr. Erdogan is angry that the United States denied Turkey access to the F-35 stealth fighter after his 2017 purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system. Turkey is now lobbying instead to buy enhanced F-16 fighters but has met stiff resistance in Congress from the likes of Mr. Menendez. Mr. Erdogan may also be seeking presidential attention. He had a friendly rapport with President Donald J. Trump, but Mr. Biden has kept his distance. Mr. Peker believes that an agreement can be negotiated between Turkey and the Nordic countries before a NATO summit in Madrid next month, which would allow for the accession protocols to be signed there. At [a talk hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations](https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-adam-smith-0) last week, Representative Adam Smith, Democrat of Washington and the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, suggested that the stakes of Swedish and Finnish membership were great enough to warrant direct U.S. involvement.

### Turkey-CN/Russia Relations – Increasing – UQ

#### Turkey’s relationship with China and Russia is getting stronger

Eldem 21, Tuba Eldem, Assistant professor of Political Science and International Relations at Fenerbahçe University, “Spotlight Turkey: A pivotal Swing State in NATO”, September 2021, [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tuba -Eldem/publication/354610810\_SPOTLIGHT\_TURKEY\_A\_PIVOTAL\_SWING\_STATE\_IN\_NATO/links/614243a8dabc4638f12b6f44/SPOTLIGHT-TURKEY-A-PIVOTAL-SWING-STATE-IN-NATO.pdf //](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tuba%20-Eldem/publication/354610810_SPOTLIGHT_TURKEY_A_PIVOTAL_SWING_STATE_IN_NATO/links/614243a8dabc4638f12b6f44/SPOTLIGHT-TURKEY-A-PIVOTAL-SWING-STATE-IN-NATO.pdf%20//) GD

Turkey has sought to expand its strategic autonomy by forming intergovernmental, military, and economic links with autocratic powers, such as Russia, China, Iran and Qatar, which provided incumbents alternative sources of political and economic support. The earlier attempts to build alternative intergovernmental linkages out of NATO had occurred in 2010 when the Chinese-Turkish joint military drills, known as Peace Mission 2010 and sponsored by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), took place in Turkey. Two years later, Turkey became a dialogue partner with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has expressed an interest in obtaining observer status or even joining as a full member. Turkey’s contract with the blacklisted Chinese company, China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corporation for a T-LORAMIDS air missile program in 2013, had eventually backfired in November 2015 under the intense pressure of the NATO and its members. In his visit to Beijing in 2019, President Erdoğan stressed that Turkey and China share a “common future vision” and re-mentioned Turkey’s desire to join SCO, which he first discussed with Russian leader Vladimir Putin back in January 2013.

Turkey’s estrangement from the West following the abortive military coup attempt on 15 July 2016 changed the external opportunity structure in favor of China and Russia. Several high-level Chinese delegations to Turkey and the strategic coordination between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Turkey’s Middle Corridor Initiative (MCI) — stretching through the Caucasus and Central Asia, all accelerated and promoted strategic cooperation between two countries that have started back in 2010.In November 2016, Turkey and China signed an agreement to align China’s BRI with Turkey’s MCI. Turkey’s geostrategic location with trade access to Europe, Iran and Russia gave Turkey primary position within the framework of the BRI, and as a result the volume of China’s FDI in Turkey has, since then, increased more than threefold. The trade volume between China and Turkey has also improved significantly reaching to 24 billion US dollars as of 2020, as Beijing became Ankara’s second-largest trading partner. Turkey and China have also engaged in developing alternative connectivity and information linkages. In 2017, Turkey signed The Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative to build an interconnected Digital Silk Road. In the same year, Turkey’s leading GSM operator Turkcell and Chinese technology giant Huawei signed an agreement in 2018 to collaborate on smart cities. In 2019, Turk Telekom partnered with Huawei to build the country’s 5G Network and claimed to set world record for single user 5G smartphone speed. In May 2021, two countries agreed during State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi visit to Ankara to further promote the synergy between China’s BRI and Turkey’s MCI, to strengthen strategic cooperation in various fields including connectivity, infrastructure construction and investment and to deepen communication and coordination for achieving the security and stability in the Middle East. Russia has also skillfully exploited the new external opportunity structure after the failed coup for its own benefit. Russia’s full-throated support for President Erdoğan during and after the coup has deepened bilateral security cooperation culminating into the arrival of the Russian S-400 air-defense system in Turkey on the date of the third anniversary of the abortive coup. While economic linkages in the areas of trade, investment, energy, and tourism have asymmetrically strengthened Russian leverage, intergovernmental linkages between two countries are also expanded thanks to several high-level state visits and formal bilateral agreements, such as the High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council.

#### Turkey participates in security cooperation with China and Russia, competing against NATO

Gaspers and Huotari 17 (Jan Gaspers and Mikko Huotari, Gaspers has a PhD in international studies, conducts research and have published various pieces on different aspects of EU-NATO cooperation, the OSCE Corfu Process, the European External Action Service and the the evolution of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, worked inter alia with the OSCE Section of the Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the OSCE and the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Mikko Huotari is the Executive Director of MERICS. His research focuses on China’s foreign policy, China-Europe relations and global (economic) governance and competition. He has published on China’s rise as a financial power, trade and investment relations with Europe as well as on geopolitical shifts related to China's emergence as a global security actor, “Turkey Looks to China for Security Cooperation Alternatives”, The German Marshalls Fund, 2017, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%2520Looks%2520to%2520China%2520for%2520Security%2520Cooperation%2520Alternatives%2520edited.pdf>) //nehahahah

Lately, Ankara has looked more actively to the East for alternatives to Euroatlantic integration, focusing in on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Observers often point to the recent Turkish–Russian strategic rapprochement as an important indicator of the viability of Ankara’s SCO ambitions. While Russia has doubtlessly been a key player within the SCO since its creation in 2001, it will be China that sets the tone for Turkey’s future relations with the SCO and the transatlantic community. Turkish suggestions that closer ties with the SCO might be traded in for NATO membership threaten to further erode transatlantic security cooperation. The United States and Europe should therefore clearly signal to Beijing that Turkey’s relationship with the SCO could increase tensions between China and transatlantic partners. At the same time, devising a convincing approach to managing Turkey’s strategic realignment will be critical to ongoing U.S. and European efforts to shape China’s increasingly visible global security ambitions in a way that is conducive to transatlantic strategic interests. Ankara Turns to the SCO The SCO serves China, Russia, and Central and South Asian member states as a forum for security cooperation, especially related to border management and counterterrorism, with training and exchanges on the latter being coordinated within the framework of an SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. SCO members also regularly conduct joint military exercises, and they cooperate on cybersecurity matters. Though Turkey has been an SCO dialogue partner since 2012, which constitutes the most basic form of association with the SCO, Ankara has used various high-profile opportunities to express interest in obtaining SCO observer status or joining the organization as a full member since 2013. President Erdoğan made his latest public reference to the idea of full SCO membership in November 2016.3 Western security analysts tend to refute the geostrategic significance of the SCO and rightly downplay its potential as a direct military competitor to NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey’s cozying up to the SCO and implicit suggestions of a trade-in for NATO membership and European integration should ring some alarm bells in Europe and the United States. Ankara might feel less inclined to please Brussels institutions as the EU membership option crumbles away and disappointment with NATO Allies grows. There can be little doubt, though, that Turkey continues to hold significant strategic value for the West when it comes to tackling regional security challenges. For EU member states, it is paramount that the refugee deal struck with Turkey in March 2016 holds firm. Turkey hosts a range of important NATO military facilities that are of vital strategic importance to the Alliance’s ability to project force in the Middle East. Turkey also remains one of the few remaining conduits the West has for communicating with Russia about strategy in Syria — even though the extent to which Turkish and wider transatlantic strategic interests on this issue align is increasingly questionable.

#### Turkey has had history of helping both sides

Wilkinson, 22 (Tracy Wilkinson, She is an experienced journalist for crisis and wars, “So, why is Turkey in NATO, anyway? A look at the country’s complex history with the alliance”, Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-06-29/so-why-is-turkey-in-nato-anyway)//IW

Emerging from World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established by 10 European countries, the United States and Canada to form a bulwark against the communist-ruled Soviet Union. It was a pillar in the new world order that was to last for the rest of the century and into this one.

In the years following World War II, Turkey found itself in a unique geopolitical position, at the crossroads of numerous civilizations, many of them at odds: Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the Caucasus. And sandwiched between the Black Sea to the north and the Mediterranean to the south.

It was eager for protection and status. In 1950, Turkey dispatched its troops to support U.S. and United Nations forces repelling North Korea’s attempted invasion of the southern part of the peninsula, an action that won enduring praise from the West.

And so in 1952, Turkey joined NATO, hoping to bolster its aspiration to a Western identity and to ensure its security, especially against an ascending Soviet Union. It was the first expansion of NATO after its founding in 1949.

That makes the problems NATO is having today with Turkey all the more curious. Once fearing the Soviet Union, Turkey now is out of step with NATO policies in its friendliness with Moscow, buying Russia’s weapons and refusing to join U.S.-led sanctions against the Russian government.

Most of these shifts can be traced to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was elected prime minister in 2003 and has not left power since.

Concessions were the real goal, several analysts said — from NATO and especially the United States. The Biden administration has kept Erdogan at arm’s length over his human rights record, arrests of thousands of dissidents and journalists, and his intervention in Syria that slaughtered U.S.-supported Kurds and backed Russia and, ultimately, the government of Bashar Assad.

A Biden administration official said Tuesday that no concessions were granted.

“What Erdogan is trying to do is engage Biden,” said Bulent Aliriza, a founding director of the Turkey project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington.

Erdogan had close relations with former President Trump, who declared himself a “big fan” of the Turkish president when he welcomed him to the White House in 2019. By contrast, President Biden has had a couple of telephone conversations with the Turkish leader — including one on Tuesday — and met him only on the margins of international conferences, as will happen at this week’s NATO meeting in Madrid.

Turkey has also sought to parlay the Russian war in Ukraine to its favor by showing NATO how it can be a valuable partner, despite its friendliness with Moscow. Members of the Erdogan family build and sell drones to the Ukrainian military. Erdogan has hosted peace talks, which have so far been unproductive, between the governments of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, and is reportedly attempting to open Black Sea ports blockaded by Russia to free up Ukrainian grain exports.

“The invasion has been a window of opportunity” for Erdogan, said Gonul Tol, who heads the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute in Washington. “It has allowed him to attempt to rebuild the image of Turkey as a key NATO ally ... a valued partner, as opposed to a year ago when Turkey was portrayed as a Trojan horse in NATO.”

But, she warned, Erdogan could easily overplay his hand.

“Maximalist demands could undermine the goodwill,” Tol said.

Though a religious government also goes against the grain in NATO, it is Turkey’s military ties with Russia that have most concerned the U.S. government and lawmakers in Washington, who demanded sanctions against Ankara.

Despite repeated warnings from Washington and NATO, Erdogan in 2019 purchased a large number of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. They are not compatible with NATO weaponry, and Western officials were worried that the purchases would give Russia access to NATO intelligence and equipment specs.

Turkey, with one of the largest militaries in all of Europe, has also sent troops to Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo to back up U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping forces.

But, Ciddi said, Erdogan “can turn the tables on the United States and NATO.”

Earlier this month, Erdogan welcomed the disgraced crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, to Ankara less than four years after journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, an act that U.S. intelligence says was ordered by Mohammed.

The killing provoked outrage throughout NATO, the U.S. and even Turkey at the time. But now Erdogan, facing dire economic conditions domestically and a potentially difficult election next year, must look for friends where he can, analysts say.

Erdogan’s relationship with Russia is complex, said Henri Barkey, a Turkey-born former State Department official who is now a professor at Lehigh University and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. For example: showing support for Ukraine but also needing Moscow to fight Kurds in Syria.

But in the end, “like Putin, Erdogan is his own worst enemy,” Barkey said, noting that his actions “undermine his credibility and they don’t trust him.”

### Logistics – Solvency – 2NC

#### Turkey’s previous involvement in Russia’s military systems shows loss of commitments with NATO allies in areas of military logistics and sustainment

Mehta 19 (Aaron Metha, Aaron Mehta is the Senior Pentagon Correspondent and Associate Editor for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department. He previously covered the Air Force and aerospace industry for Defense News from October 2012 to April 2015, and before that spent four years at the Center for Public Integrity, a non-profit investigative news organization. Over the course of his career, Mehta has interviewed dozens of top officials from the Pentagon, the defense industry and international partners. He has traveled abroad with the Secretary of Defense, conducted one-on-one meetings with defense ministers from the United Kingdom, Norway, Poland and Sweden, and had work featured on NPR, CNN and other outlets. Among his professional recognitions, Mehta was selected for the Center for a New American Security’s 2017 Next Generation National Security Leaders fellowship, the National Press Foundation’s 2011 Paul Miller fellowship, and was named “Best Young Journalist” at the 2015 Aerospace Media Awards. Mehta is a native of the Boston area and a graduate of Tufts University, “Turkey officially kicked out of F-35 program, costing US half a billion dollars,” 7-17-19, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/)//nehahahah

WASHINGTON — The U.S. has removed Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program, and Turkey will lose its [production work](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/06/07/turkish-suppliers-to-be-eliminated-from-f-35-program-in-2020/) on the jet by March 2020, following its acceptance of the S-400 Russian-made air defense system [last Friday](https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/07/12/turkey-has-the-s-400-the-trump-administration-is-silent/). However, a top Pentagon official would not close the door on Turkey [rejoining the program](https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/04/23/the-us-air-force-not-turkey-is-frustrating-lockheed-execs-on-the-f-35-program/) in some form, should it reverse the decision to buy the S-400. The White House issued a statement Wednesday confirming the move, which Washington had threatened for months. “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible,” the White House statement read. “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” “Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO Ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO Allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems," the statement continued. Shortly after the statement was released, the Pentagon held a rare on-camera press conference to explain the process moving forward, with Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ellen Lord and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg.

#### Turkey is continuously mistrusted over military logistics – It’s empirical collaboration with Russian defense systems proves

Cohen 21 (Rachel Cohen, Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Magazine, covers science and technology programs, space, Congress, the nuclear enterprise, C4ISR, and mor, graduated from American University and previously worked at Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, “Biden’s Pentagon to keep Turkey out of the F-35 Program,” AirForce magazine, 2-5-21, https://www.airforcemag.com/bidens-pentagon-to-keep-turkey-out-of-f-35-program/)//nehahahhaha

The Biden administration is continuing its predecessor’s policy of excluding Turkey from the international F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, Pentagon spokesman John Kirby indicated Feb. 5. Pentagon officials kicked Turkey, a NATO ally, out of the F-35 coalition because it bought the S-400 air defense system from Russia—a purchase the U.S. said puts American military information at risk. The Trump administration believed the advanced fighter jet used by troops around the world cannot coexist with a surface-to-air missile system designed to take out those same planes. That argument remains, even as new leadership takes the reins. “Our position has not changed,” Kirby said at a Pentagon press briefing. “The S-400 is incompatible with the F-35 and Turkey has been suspended from that program.” The U.S. urges Ankara not to keep the S-400, which began arriving in 2019. Turkey should instead invest in the American-made Patriot air defense missile system, Kirby added. “Turkey had multiple opportunities over the last decade to purchase the Patriot defense system from the United States and instead chose to purchase the S-400, which provides Russia revenue, access, and influence,” he said. The U.S. Air Force bought the eight F-35As initially built for Turkey, but never delivered under an $861.7 million contract. Turkey had already ordered when it was ousted, and is being cut out of the F-35 supply chain over the course of the next two years as well. In December, the U.S. sanctioned Turkey over its embrace of the S-400, in accordance with federal law, though the Trump administration held off on doing so for more than a year. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act further mandated that the government impose at least five penalties on Turkey, as required by the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), within 30 days of its enactment on Jan. 1.

### NATO/EU Cred – I/L – 2NC

#### Turkey paralyzes NATO and decks credibility and influence

Got 20 (Antoine Got, current Europe policy advisor for the Canadian gov, former Staff Officer for NATO in the Operations division and Crisis Response Systems and Exercises division, former Staff Officer for SHAPE in the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre; “Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO”, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/ )

NATO’s most important challenge today may not come from Russia, but from within. With the number of disputes between Turkey and several European allies yet again on the rise, the two parties’ souring relations have begun undermining the organization’s cohesion and ability to make timely collective decisions. If left unaddressed, these tensions could cause serious damage to the world’s most powerful alliance. The latest flashpoint came from Turkey’s open backing of Azerbaijan’s war effort in the small landlocked enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended abruptly in early November thanks to a Russian-brokered deal. Reports of [military assistance](https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/09/28/turkish-drones-over-nagorno-karabakh-and-other-updates-from-a-day-old-war/#35529d9770da) and alleged [Syrian mercenaries](https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/05/nagorno-karabakh-syrians-turkey-armenia-azerbaijan/) sent by Turkey placed Ankara at loggerheads with its [NATO allies’ calls](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178333.htm) for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The deal, which foresees Baku reacquiring sizeable portions of the disputed enclave, has made Turkey one of the [obvious winners](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54903869) of the recent flare-up, while its Western allies [remain on the sidelines](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-win-eu-loss-in-nagorno-karabakh/). For some, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, adding to a long list of complaints they have recently leveled against their NATO ally.

Last month, Greece and Turkey came dangerously close to a [head-on naval confrontation](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53497741) in disputed Eastern Mediterranean waters over Turkey’s gas exploration activities near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, just a few hundred meters away from the Turkish coast. Though Turkey later withdrew its ship, tensions between the two NATO allies spiked again following [Turkey’s announcement](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201112-turkey-extends-research-ships-mission-in-eastern-mediterranean/) that it would send the ship back for a 10-day seismic research mission in the area, renewing Greek calls for sanctions. What makes this a particularly explosive situation, of course, is the two Eastern Mediterranean powers’ lingering dispute over the post-1974 division of Cyprus and the discovery of energy resources in the area. A similar confrontational encounter occurred in June when France and Turkey nearly [came to blows](https://euobserver.com/foreign/148704) after a French warship, the Courbet, tried to inspect a Turkish vessel for allegedly breaching a U.N. arms embargo on Libya — a claim Ankara [fiercely denies](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-france-turkey-military-idUSKBN23O3CZ). [Supporting different sides](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/06/26/the-battle-for-libya-growing-french-turkish-rivalry-in-the-mediterranean/) in the Libyan Civil War, the two allies have been engaged in a war of words over each other’s provocative deeds in the [Libyan](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/30/frances-macron-slams-turkeys-criminal-role-in-libya), [Syrian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/29/macrons-criticism-of-syria-invasion-sick-and-shallow-says-erdogan) and [Nagorno-Karabakh](https://in.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-putin-macron-int/france-accuses-turkey-of-sending-syrian-jihadists-to-nagorno-karabakh-idUSKBN26L3T4) conflicts, as well as over Turkey’s territorial claims in the Mediterranean. The latest spat followed President Emmanuel Macron’s [defense of a cartoonist’s right](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/31/frances-macron-cartoons-came-from-free-and-independent-news) to caricature religious figures in the wake of a teacher’s beheading, to which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded by [calling for a boycott](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54692485) of French products.

Within NATO, the escalation in tensions and growing entanglement of the two camps’ now numerous disputes reflects European allies’ mounting frustration over what they perceive as Turkey’s self-serving and aggressive regional posturing, and its unwillingness to consult allies before acting. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey has always occupied a somewhat unique role in the alliance. Its size, military resources, and key position at the doorstep of Asia — in other words, as NATO’s southern flank — give it important strategic relevance within the context of renewed interest in the Middle East. Though relations have often been fragile, especially since the [2016 coup attempt](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)589776), the current rift marks a new low in the recent history of the alliance, with potentially damaging consequences. Given this backdrop, NATO should take advantage of its own resources to try to address its members’ deteriorating relations, and work to reconcile their diverging security interests. This is a lot easier said than done, but it may be the only option to prevent a more fundamental rupture in the relationship. Divided We Stand As tensions grow, a key risk for NATO relates to the crisis’ potential to hamper its cohesion and ability to act decisively, as the alliance relies on the [principle of consensus](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm) to successfully operate. Every major NATO decision embodies the collective will of all allies and results, therefore, from a complex but fragile process of negotiation wherein nations are invited to compromise on matters of mutual interest. The inevitable drawback to this is that every ally possesses a de facto right to veto any NATO issue if its demands are not met, which they may be incentivized to use as leverage to pursue national interests. The same can be said of the European Union, which operates on unanimity and where Cyprus recently made headlines for [blocking sanctions](https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/cyprus-blocks-eus-belarus-sanctions-plan/) on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, insisting on the imposition of E.U. measures on Turkey for its energy exploration in Mediterranean waters. The European Union was [criticized](https://www.politico.eu/article/borrell-admits-eu-credibility-is-at-stake-in-failure-to-sanction-belarus/) for failing to agree on timely sanctions.

Unlike the European Union, NATO consultations are held behind closed doors, and disagreements largely avoid public scrutiny. In principle, however, any nation’s objections could stall key alliance policy or business. Last year, leaks revealed that Turkey had [threatened on the eve of a NATO summit to block](https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/turkey-continues-to-block-natos-eastern-defence-plans/) a key defense plan to protect the Baltic states and Poland against Russian aggression unless NATO backed its own recognition of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia as terrorists. Likewise, for years, Turkey had vetoed NATO cooperation with neutral Austria under its partnership program in response to Vienna’s calls for the European Union to halt membership talks with Ankara. Though in both cases deals were eventually reached to break the deadlock, and though such negotiation tactics are not uncommon, these incidents highlight a mounting climate of uncooperativeness and unwillingness to compromise between allies, making interaction increasingly difficult. As Ankara grows more defiant, NATO members are indeed finding it difficult to reign in their southeastern ally. With the 2011 Arab Spring and its aftermath, the rapid deterioration of Turkey’s regional and domestic security environments has coincided with a growing perception that its Western allies are not giving enough credence to its core security interests. The stalled European Union [membership project](https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkeys-eu-membership-bid-evaporating-commission-says/), together with America’s disengagement from the Middle East, support for the [Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/09/the-us-played-down-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-forces-that-couldnt-last/), and persistent [refusal to extradite](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-khashoggi-usa-gulen-idUSKCN1NL2FJ) cleric Fethullah Gülen, the presumed mastermind of the failed 2016 coup attempt, have all contributed to strengthening the conviction that Turkish security interests are likely best served through autonomous action — and not by relying on a suspicious and divided West. This impression is reinforced by Europe’s [vocal criticism](https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-democracy-backsliding-eu-says-in-membership-report/a-48965952) of Erdoğan’s concentration of executive power, and by the country’s worsening economic and social woes.

Overall, these factors have eroded NATO’s credibility and influence over Ankara, just as the latter has become more conscious of its own considerable leverage over Europe due to its key role in Syria, which NATO sees as the defense of its southern frontier, and in easing the pressure to accommodate large arrivals of refugees on European shores. The former is linked to Turkey’s vetoing of NATO’s defense plan for Poland and the Baltics, which aimed at compelling NATO to provide greater support in Turkey’s defense of the alliance’s southern flank — something Ankara has demanded for years. Likewise, Turkey’s handling of its [four million-strong refugee population](https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Turkey%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20September%202020_1.pdf), the largest in the world, has contributed to Ankara’s influence over Brussels through its instrumentalization of fears that it would “open the gates” to Europe for migrants and refugees, which Erdoğan announced earlier this year in violation of a 2016 E.U.-Turkish agreement. Given its shrewd sense that the tables have turned, Ankara has lost many incentives to cooperate. Of course, one key risk is that Turkey’s bold strategy backfires and leads to a fresh round of retaliatory measures such as [collective sanctions](https://www.euronews.com/2020/10/15/calls-growing-for-eu-sanctions-against-turkey-over-actions-in-eastern-mediterranean-and-cy) or cutbacks in E.U. funds, with damaging effects on Turkey’s weakening economy.

For NATO, another conceivable consequence lays in the reinforcement of calls for greater European “[strategic autonomy](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/28/l-autonomie-strategique-europeenne-est-l-objectif-de-notre-generation-discours-du-president-charles-michel-au-groupe-de-reflexion-bruegel/)” in the realms of defense and security, with potentially harmful repercussions on the future of the transatlantic community. Against a backdrop of deteriorating Euro-Atlantic relations, several leaders have begun to publicly question the relevance and effectiveness of NATO as an organization. A staunch advocate of the “strategic autonomy” concept, Macron reacted to the clash with Turkey over the arms embargo on Libya by reiterating his assertion that NATO was “[brain dead](https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/23/emmanuel-macron-turkey-is-playing-a-dangerous-game-in-libya)” for being unable to temper Turkish adventurism. In a recent [interview](https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-president-armen-sarkissian-nato-turkey-involvement-nagorno-karabakh/), Armenian President Armen Sarkissian echoed these remarks by putting at stake NATO’s credibility over the organization’s seeming inability to influence its member’s involvement in the Caucasus. Were NATO to become increasingly paralyzed by souring internal relations, doubts about the effectiveness and reliability of the organization could further incentivize E.U. countries into acting beyond the NATO framework. Regrettably, this could result in accelerating E.U. states’ ostracizing of Ankara, while persuading some allies into seeking additional bilateral arrangements as more reliable forms of security guarantees.

**Turkey currently lowers NATO and EU credibility with relations to Russia**

**Kogan 18** (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. <http://gpf-europe.com/upload/esd_02-2018-2-30-32_kogan.pdf>) – ED

The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY  restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.

#### Turkey’s partnership with Russia threatens NATO/EU Cred

Mehta 19 (Arnav Mehta, deputy editor and senior Pentagon correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Defense Department and its international partners, “Turkey officially kicked out of F-35 program, costing US half a billion dollars,” DefenseNews, 7/17/19, <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/>/eo

WASHINGTON — The U.S. has removed Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program, and Turkey will lose its production work on the jet by March 2020, following its acceptance of the S-400 Russian-made air defense system last Friday. However, a top Pentagon official would not close the door on Turkey rejoining the program in some form, should it reverse the decision to buy the S-400. The White House issued a statement Wednesday confirming the move, which Washington had threatened for months. “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible,” the White House statement read. “The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” “Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO Ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO Allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems," the statement continued. Shortly after the statement was released, the Pentagon held a rare on-camera press conference to explain the process moving forward, with Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Ellen Lord and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg. “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform in proximity to where the F-35 program makes repairs, and houses the F-35,” Lord said. “Much of the F-35′s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long term security of the F-35 program. We seek only to protect the long term security of the F-35 program.” Turkey, a partner in the F-35 program that helped fund the development of the jet, planned to buy 100 F-35As. Its first jet was rolled out in June 2018 in a festive “delivery ceremony." Though Turkey formally owns its jets, the U.S. has said it has the power to keep the planes from moving to Turkish soil and intends to keep all four existing Turkish jets from leaving the U.S. Lord avoided saying that the door was shut on Turkey returning to the program should the S-400 be removed from its soil and repeatedly used the term “suspension” to characterize Turkey’s status in the F-35 program. When asked twice whether Turkey could be welcomed back if the situation changes, Lord did not give a direct answer one way or the other. “At this point, the Turks have made a decision. We have said the F-35 and S-400 are incompatible. We will work forward at this point to unwind the relationship," she said. All Turkish F-35 personnel have been informed they must leave the U.S. by July 31, including 20 individuals assigned to the Joint Program Office. Neither official would comment on if any of those individuals have requested asylum. By March 2020, Turkey’s industrial participation in the F-35 program, which includes production on about 900 parts for the stealthy fighter, will be “unwound." Lord said the projection is this will cost Turkey’s economy around $9 billion over the life of the program. American suppliers will initially fill those production roles, but the goal is to eventually farm some of it out to other partners. Lord said the process will have “minimal” impacts on the larger F-35 program because of the planning that has already gone on for several months. To move the production from Turkey to the U.S. will require between $500-$600 million in nonrecurring engineering costs, Lord said. Which partners, if any, would be willing to buy the F-35s already in production for Turkey was still being worked out. Trachtenberg consistently delivered the same message over and over: that this situation is not one that should impact the broader NATO alliance. That includes Turkey’s participation in NATO exercises, particularly upcoming events in Georgia, Germany and Ukraine. Asked several times how Turkey having an air-defense system that cannot be linked to other NATO systems and could be used to spy on NATO jets would not harm alliance cohesion, Trachtenberg repeatedly said the relationship between Turkey, the U.S. and NATO will be able to continue. In a statement, Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor on the F-35 program, said, “This is a government-to-government matter, and as always, we are following official U.S. Government guidance as it relates to delivery of the F-35 to Turkey and the export of goods from the Turkish supply chain.” “Over the last several months we’ve been working to establish alternative sources of supply in the United States to quickly accommodate Turkey’s current contributions to the program. These actions will limit any future production or sustainment impact and we remain on track to meet our commitment of delivering 131 F-35s this year,” the statement added.

#### Turkey creates conflict within NATO

Tuncer 22, Murat Abdullah Tuncer, studied political science in Conley American University, “Turkey's Options for Finland and Sweden's NATO Membership Applications”, May 2022, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Murat-Tuncer-7/publication/360815928\_Turkey%27s\_Options\_for\_Finland\_and\_Sweden%27s\_NATO\_Membership\_Applications/links/628cd57fd4e5243d9b961df4/Turkeys-Options-for-Finland-and-Swedens-NATO-Membership-Applications.pdf//AB

After Turkey intervened in Cyprus in July 1974, Greece left the military wing of NATO, claiming that NATO did not prevent Turkey's intervention in Cyprus. This event undoubtedly affected Turkey-Greece relations deeply; moreover, it worried the Western imperial powers sensitive to the control of the Aegean-Mediterranean. Western powers intensified their attempts to bring together their two allies, whose presence and cooperation they needed in the Aegean- Mediterranean, once again, under the umbrella of NATO. They advised Greece to return to NATO and Turkey not to take a negative stance.

Shortly after the intervention, Turkey declared NOTAM 714 in July 1974 and made flights in a 50-mile area over the Aegean subject to its permission. Greece, which was in a difficult situation and lost its command and control authority in the Aegean, announced in 1976, two years later, that it wanted to return to the military wing of NATO. Still, Turkey stipulated the redefinition of the command-control areas in the Aegean for this. NATO European Commander-in-Chief Alexander Haig and then Gen. Rogers attempted with Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel, but they could not get results.

The disagreement between the parties continued. In the second half of the 70s, as the Soviet Union's influence in the Mediterranean increased, especially after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the collapse of the pro-US Shah regime in Iran, Western powers increased the pressure on Greece to return to the military wing of NATO.

Turkey spent the second half of the 1970s struggling against the US embargo abroad and trying to suppress the right-left conflict at home.

#### Turkey is becoming an unreliable ally in NATO and seems to be getting closer with Russia

Randall 17, Ryan Randall, commander of 104th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, attended Air Command and Staff College and Air War College, “Turkey and NATO – (Un) Happy Together”, 1/1/17, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1054982.pdf //AB

In 1952 both Turkey and Greece joined NATO, decided largely out of Cold War strategies against the Soviet Union. While some question why Turkey, a country nearly 2,000 miles from the north Atlantic, was offered membership into the Alliance, the reason was two- fold: its strategic location within Europe and the underlying principle of the Truman Doctrine – “extending military and economic aid to states vulnerable to Soviet threat / expansion.”1 Membership in NATO guaranteed that Turkey would not become a Soviet ally and expanded NATO’s reach eastward toward, what was then, the Soviet Union. With firmly anti-Communist governments, “Greece and Turkey were viewed by the West as bulwarks against Moscow and the spread of communism in Europe.”2 With the Korean War on the horizon, “fears of China and Russia expanding their influence into other parts of the world were realized. (Both Greece and Turkey contributed troops to fight in Korea).”3 While Turkey can be viewed as an important member of the Alliance and a reliable ally for nearly six decades, Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the West has been both complicated and tumultuous. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s continual defiance of the democratic principles that form the bedrock of the United Nations Charter has pinned the Alliance against one of its own members. Last year’s failed coup attempt to overthrow President Erdogan was a watershed moment that has further strained Turkey-NATO relations, jeopardizing Turkey’s close ties with the Alliance, while pushing it toward warming relations with Russia. NATO must not stand by and watch the erosion of democracy take place from within Turkey. The Alliance must come together and develop new protocols for dealing with a member that continually defies the fundamental principles shared by all Allies: freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The Organization must reaffirm their clear commitment to the democratic values that form the cornerstone of the Alliance and oppose any and all actions that deter from their mission to establish peace and stability around the world.

#### Turkey continually damages NATO’s democracy and it’s credibility in political and millitary alliances

Conley 18 (Heather Conley, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC AND DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE PROGRAM AT CSIS, “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Damaging NATO?,” Carnegie Europe, 1-24-18, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75345) //nehahaha

Any NATO member that purposefully diminishes its democratic principles and institutions damages the alliance. Every NATO member is a signatory to the alliance’s founding document, the 1949 Washington Treaty, and its preamble states that all members are “… determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Although we associate NATO solely with its military operations, NATO is a political-military alliance with democratic principles at its core. Turkey has so greatly diminished its democracy over the past several years that an independent U.S. organization, Freedom House, has recently declared the country “not free.” Unfortunately, Turkey is not a NATO outlier in this regard but is part of a growing trend. Poland, Hungary, and Romania are also actively diminishing judicial independence, institutional transparency, and the ability to express political opposition; the very essence of democracy. These countries also damage the credibility of this crucial political alliance. But as a critical NATO member, Turkey’s military interventions in the Middle East—whether it is the shooting down of a Russian military aircraft or repeated unilateral military interventions in Iraq and Syria—increasingly place Turkey’s national security at risk, which places NATO at risk of becoming involved in the broader regional conflict. Thus, Turkey inflicts ongoing damage to NATO politically and militarily.

#### **Turkey has historically acted upon its own interests, rather than those of NATO**

Brown 22 (Ethan Brown, 11-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force as a Special Operations Joint Terminal Attack controller, currently the senior fellow for Defense Studies at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, “NATO must push for full accountability from Turkey,” The Hill, 7/1/22, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3543770-nato-must-push-for-full-accountability-from-turkey//eo)

All eyes this week were on the Madrid summit, where NATO leaders were expected to announce new military postures, security cooperation, and future planning for collective defense in light of the ongoing Ukraine crisis. The biggest thing to come out of the summit was Turkey’s ultimate reversal of its block on Finland and Sweden from becoming new members — new member admittance requires a unanimous vote to pass. This issue loomed largely and reiterated Ankara’s confrontational and often complicating role in the alliance to date. As a great many changes in Europe’s security organization are expected to evolve in the near future, now is an ideal time to address issues with Turkey’s actions as a NATO member, for the sake of future accountability and legitimacy within the alliance. With Russia backpedaling from global pressure, to say nothing of its flagging efforts in Eastern Ukraine, Turkey’s most significant geopolitical clout outside of NATO is at its weakest point in years. Historically, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has played both sides of the alliance. The Turkish president has courted Moscow’s favor (purchasing S-400 air defense systems) while enjoying benefits of mutual security and military aid, such as F-16s and other aviation equipment expected later this year in a “make or break” moment in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey has never hesitated to exploit unrest in Europe to further Erdogan’s personal agenda. In 2019 it crossed the Syrian border to butcher formerly American-allied Kurds, while also throwing its considerable military weight behind Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to bolster its regional influence. More recently, Ankara has simultaneously closed off the Bosporus to Russian warships and offered to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv — mere months after meeting with President Vladimir Putin hat in hand to bargain for economic and military concessions and aid. President Erdogan’s bid to block Finland and Sweden from joining NATO was due to their alleged support of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) members, whom Turkey has labeled a terrorist organization, a point of contention — though not accountability — between Ankara and the West. Turkey has been able to conduct itself thusly because of the unique importance of its geography. Its close proximity to the Levant served as a waystation (Incirlik Air Base) for nearly two decades of the global war on terror, where tens of thousands of U.S. and coalition service members passed through on their way to Iraq and Afghanistan — meaning Ankara’s actions were often ignored when addressing global policy, so long as the bases and airspace allowed for the use in the ongoing war efforts elsewhere. Assertions that “there is a strongman holding NATO hostage, and it’s not Putin” are both accurate and compelling and require NATO to rethink what it demands of its member states. Like much else regarding European security, the war in Ukraine upset existing norms of state conduct and geopolitics, or at least simplified them. NATO member states have all increased defense spending, vowed to take more pronounced roles in ensuring the continents’ stability and have universally condemned the conduct of authoritarians like Vladimir Putin — all signs that the alleged ‘brain death’ of NATO is now in recovery. Yet for Turkey’s part, hamstringing the needs of the alliance over its own regional power brokerages, even if it has reversed course on the matter of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, has been a regular and consistent means of undermining the alliance. NATO has excelled at unifying against unacceptable behaviors since Feb. 24, when Russian troops first crossed into Ukraine. It has thus far achieved tremendous success in finding means to counter Moscow while not directly engaging in the conflict in Eastern Europe, demonstrating resolve and fortitude in preparing for further aggression. But much of legitimizing the alliance in the future hangs on member states acting in common purpose on all accounts — and Ankara’s actions to date demand a higher level of accountability. The reversal by President Erdogan to confer Finland and Sweden is a positive sign, one that should be seized upon by NATO leaders to demand greater accountability for one of its oldest and foremost member states. The alliance’s own purpose statement, chiefly asserting collective trans-Atlantic security, also provides that the institution “engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield, prevent and manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” Any claim that Turkey has prevented or managed crises, stabilized conflict situations, or upheld the collective values of the Alliance is sorely misplaced. NATO must demand the highest conduct of its member states, both as a means to discredit authoritarian tyrants and to ensure its future cooperative security efficacy. This includes incentivizing Turkey’s responsibility in NATO membership and retracting from Russian cooperation. Permitting new NATO members should only be the beginning of Turkey’s return to credible alliance membership.

### XT: EU Cred – ! – 2NC

#### EU credibility is a necessity for global stability

Weinstein 2017

(“Why the US needs Europe” President and CEO of Hudson Institute, written widely on international affairs for leading publications in the United States, Europe, and Asia. He is an expert on U.S. foreign policy and international affairs who comments on national and international affairs on television and in numerous publications, including The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, Bungei Shimbun (Japan), Le Figaro and Le Monde.) 15. 3. 2017)[Why the US Needs Europe - Aspen Institute Central Europe](https://www.aspen.review/article/2017/why-the-us-needs-europe/) - JL

Today, by any number of measures, the EU and the U.S. are drifting apart. Support for the transatlantic alliance is at a post-World War II low. There are many manifestations of what has been termed “continental drift”: inwards turns by both the U.S. and the EU after the economic crisis, an America increasingly focused on the Pacific, tensions over the Snowden revelations, the absence of U.S. leadership on Syria and Ukraine, and lastly, divergent views within Europe of the critical importance of the U.S. The potential future effectiveness of the alliance has been put into question by weakening European defense capabilities and a U.S. President determined to shrink America’s footprint abroad. In short, the Atlantic Alliance is in crisis. Presidents Clinton and Bush undertook historic efforts to bring critical parts of post-Communist Eastern Europe into the Alliance. By contrast, President Obama’s lack of engagement in European affairs seems to signal to Europe that it is no longer a major American strategic concern after the end of the Cold War. This crisis notwithstanding, the U.S. needs closer engagement with Europe on crucial defense and foreign policy matters. The U.S. under President Obama may be turning inward; but the fact remains: Europe is vital and irreplaceable to us. History and culture bind the U.S. and Europe together; Europe discovered us, shaped our thinking, and forms of government. But there is more than just cultural affinity that unites us. There is a deep moral scope to the alliance. It was, after all, in the West that concepts such as limited government, individual rights, freedom of worship, free markets, and equal rights for women arose. The moral basis of our alliance embodied in these concepts was critical to our heroic joint efforts leading the fierce external opposition to totalitarianism that helped bring down the Iron Curtain. The common defense threats we face in the 21st century—almost all on the periphery of the U.S. or the EU—are different in scope and kind: conventional challenges such as Russia bent on dominating its near abroad or China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial matters and growing military prowess; others are unconventional, including the spread of radical Islam and terrorism in the Middle East and beyond, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries such as Iran and North Korea. In an age of extremist ideologies, non-state actors with increasingly widespread technological capacities could pose the greatest threats of all to international order. Other challenges that arise from the “arc of instability” to the south of Europe—including migration and unruly political transitions in the Arab world—require a mix of hard and soft power. The diplomatic flexibility that approaches by a multiplicity of states in Europe can afford— combined with the potential threat of hard power when necessary—offers the most diverse set of tools to handle such crises. Our moral message and policy prescriptions are much stronger when unified; we are able to achieve far more together than alone. But to achieve unity, as the last decade has shown, we really have to work at it. This means more than occasional consultations, after the fact, as has often been the case during the Obama administration. Strong U.S.-European relations require regular consultations, give and take, even blunt conversations— not just lectures from Washington or from Brussels or European capitals—to give Europeans a stake of ownership in policies. This ownership will allow them and us to make the case for shared sacrifice to their and our polities—a case that needs to be made in politics since the choices officials face in security policy are often less than optimal. The failure of American leadership since 2009 to make such arguments at home has weakened our ability to expect our allies to make the same kinds of cases to their publics, thereby harming the alliance. Americans cannot “go it alone.” Europe offers America an invaluable tool: a key multilateral dimension to policy. With it, comes greater credibility in the international arena and a greater capacity to undertake complex missions. America has to lead, but Europe has to be our partner, willing to be vocal when we are unwilling to meet out responsibilities. Without it comes the excessive swings of American foreign and defense policy that have led us, in recent years, to shirk our global responsibilities. Europeans contributed in crucial ways to the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and were absolutely central to the intervention in Libya. France’s willingness to intervene in Mali and the Central African Republic with assistance from the U.S. and the E.U. at a time when the U.S. is less willing on new anti-terror interventions is a very positive sign. But French interventionism, as welcome as it is, cannot make up for shrinking defense budgets and reluctant leadership from both Germany and the U.K. The U.S. needs to encourage its allies to assume their responsibilities. Although Europe’s armed forces are less strong and less well equipped than desirable, European armed forces are, in fact, well-trained, technologically sophisticated and also geographically closer to the regions that are likely to be critical in the 21st century—North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The manpower and cost efficiencies from potential joint operations cannot be overstated. Europeans can bring unmatched sensibilities in their own backyard, but need to assume their responsibilities. Their knowledge of history and culture is essential. This knowledge and willingness to use “soft power” has to be joined to a sense of the importance of burden sharing, especially as American forces are overstretched in a time of declining American defense budgets. Increasing isolationism in both American political parties should serve as a wakeup call to Europe that we might not always be there to help police Europe’s periphery as in Kosovo or Libya. The greater distance we are assuming from Europe should make us all the more sympathetic to European defense initiatives. Given the deeper challenges we face, it is time to leave aside “theological” debates over whether NATO or the EU should be the prime focus for the future of European defense. Instead, we need to focus on how best to meet common strategic challenges with the array of resources, diplomatic and military, that we can muster. When Europeans and Americans work together for shared purpose, the partnership enhances us both and makes our complex and simultaneous missions much easier to accomplish.

### EU Cred – Brink – ! – 2NC

#### EU cred is at stake.

Lahodynsky 20(Otmar Lahodynsky, former president of the Association of European journalists. The EU’s credibility is at stake, New Europe, 11/20/20, <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/the-eus-credibility-is-at-stake/>) – JL

In July, after a four-day marathon summit in Brussels, there was agreement on the EU budget for 2021-2027 and a recovery fund for the EU’s 27 members following the COVID-19 crisis. Together, almost €2 trillion have been reserved for this purpose. The €750 billion corona aid package is intended to help those countries that have been the most affected by the disease, including as Italy, Spain and France, but also the other Member States as they will need to rebuild their economies. At the EU summit, a typical Brussels-style compromise was reached – each head of government presented themself as a winner at home if they will receive a lot of money for economic recovery. It was then that the so-called “frugal four” – Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden (plus Finland) – forced a reduction in the number of grants in exchange for an increase in the share of loans and a cut in their membership fees. The heads of Poland and Hungary also celebrated at home after the successfully de-linked their access to EU funding from their records on the rule of law. Subsequently, however, the other EU states introduced this clause by a clear majority. The Poles and Hungarians felt pressured and they vetoed the seven-year EU budget, which requires unanimity despite the fact that they were not bothered that they had previously approved it. In his explanatory statement, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki railed against an “attack on Polish sovereignty” and adding that the EU was no longer the same as when Poland had joined the bloc in 2004, a generation after the end of Communism. Morawiecki said the Polish economy was so strong that it no longer needed any subsidies from Brussels (more than €12 billion each year). Morawiecki said that Poles were even considering an EU withdrawal along the lines of Brexit. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Brussels’ bête noire, went even further. In his view, the EU is acting like the Soviet Union once did. It wants to blackmail Hungary and force it to accept Middle Eastern refugees. In the future, Orban added, the European Commission would have the power to meddle in the internal politics of all of the Member States, as it sees fit. Orban also emphasized that the EU’s previous accusations against Hungary were all unfounded and that the concept of the rule of law was not precisely or universally defined. The reality is that these core concepts of the bloc were long-ago enshrined in the EU treaties and in Europe’s charter of fundamental rights. Conditions for EU accession were already laid down in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and include the stability of institutions, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and respect and protection of minorities. The Commission has, for too long, turned a blind eye to the transgressions of the nationalistic populists in Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European countries. The isolated attempts to bring about punitive proceedings under Article 7 of the EU Treaty did not act as a deterrent, because sanctions were not imposed. For this reason, the governments of Hungary and Poland mutually helped each other. But now the basic principles of the EU, above all the rule of law, are being put to the test. When Brussels collectively raises billions of euros for emergency aid against the pandemic for the first time through common debts, it must be ensured that this money is spent correctly. The EU also owes this to its taxpayers. In Hungary, Orban’s confidants and his family have collected a lot more than €5 billion in subsidies from Brussels every year, mainly through agricultural subsidies. The European Council in a new report this week criticized Hungary for not fighting against corruption. In an ironic echo of Hungary’s totalitarian Communist past, nearly all of Hungary’s independent or critical media have been brought into line or closed down and the scientific community and cultural institutions are also under Orban’s control. In Poland, the independence of the judiciary was dangerously undermined on several occasions. Some cities have established their own “LGTB-free zones” and, with the support of Poland’s notoriously arch-conservative branch of the Catholic Church, a ban on abortion was imposed recently with only a few exceptions. The EU must protect the rule of law and fundamental European values more strongly than before for another reason. If these are violated without consequences, how can Europe require new candidate countries to respect these values? A way out of the stalemate seems difficult. The European Parliament has made it clear that it will not accept any amendments to the draft. “These nationalistic, populist positions and unanimity are the grave-diggers of the EU,” said Othmar Karas, the Vice-President of the European Parliament who asked for the exclusion of Orban’s Fidesz-party from the European People’s Party. Fortunately, the budget for 2021 has already been adopted. It contains innovations, including more money for future areas such as digitalization and climate protection. If Poland and Hungary retain their veto, this budget could be prolonged annually. The €750 billion COVID aid package could possibly be decoupled from the EU budget. In that case, such support through joint borrowing could only be decided for 24 countries – without Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. It is a more laborious path, but possibly the only one, as the EU’s credibility as a global player is at stake.

## Solvency – 2NC

### General – Solvency – 2NC

#### The plan is not key - Turkey’s only security cooperation with the U.S. is happening outside of NATO platforms

Oğuzlu 12 (Tarık Oğuzlu, He is currently a Prof. Dr. in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya International University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, a Master of Science degree in IR, and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken taken from Bilkent University. He teaches courses on International Relations Theories, International Politics, European Union Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Foreign Policy Analysis and Turkish Foreign Policy. He works on the following subjects: international relations theories, Europeanization of foreign policy, European Union foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO/US, Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus dispute, Turkey and the Middle East. He has academic articles published in such journals as Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, International Journal, Security Dialogue, Middle Eastern Studies, Turkish Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security, International Spectator, Contemporary Security Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler, etc. He is also the head of Center for Social, Economic and Politics Research, “Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” *Turkish Studies, The Washington Quarterly,* 7-25-12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706578)//nehahahahha

Also, the reluctance of some Western European Alliance members to recognize the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization and to push for the PKK to end its activities in Turkish territory has worried Ankara. As long as a majority of Turks believes that the PKK owes its existence in part to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO is bound to decrease in the years to come.5 In contrast, the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, has gradually adopted a non-European strategic outlook by considering developments outside the continent as more vital to its national security interests. Yet, Washington has begun to value Turkey’s security cooperation in more bilateral rather than multilateral platforms. In other words, even though Washington’s need to secure Turkey’s strategic cooperation has dramatically increased, the Americans have generally tried to achieve this bilaterally, outside of NATO platforms. Another important factor contributing to the rise of Turkish skepticism toward NATO has been the changing nature of global politics. As the world has become more multipolar, or even nonpolar, and as interstate relations have increasingly taken shape in more multilateral and interdependent settings, NATO-like collective defense organizations have become outdated. In addition, changing power configurations within the international system seem to have increased Turkey’s capability to pursue a multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy. Finally, Turkey’s relations with Russia on one hand, and Middle Eastern countries on the other, will likely also shape Turkey’s future view of NATO.6 Turkey is not an exception to the idea that, as the world has increasingly become post-Western, many states have revised their foreignand security-policy strategies to adapt to the new security environment.

### EU Security Coop – Solvency – 2NC

#### European Security Cooperation has decreased with Turkey since the Cold War – Turkey is seen as part of the Middle Eastern security architecture rather than NATO’s

Oğuzlu 12 (Tarık Oğuzlu, He is currently a Prof. Dr. in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya International University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, a Master of Science degree in IR, and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken taken from Bilkent University. He teaches courses on International Relations Theories, International Politics, European Union Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Foreign Policy Analysis and Turkish Foreign Policy. He works on the following subjects: international relations theories, Europeanization of foreign policy, European Union foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO/US, Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus dispute, Turkey and the Middle East. He has academic articles published in such journals as Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, International Journal, Security Dialogue, Middle Eastern Studies, Turkish Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security, International Spectator, Contemporary Security Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler, etc. He is also the head of Center for Social, Economic and Politics Research, “Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” *Turkish Studies, The Washington Quarterly,* 7-25-12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706578)//nehahahahha

NATO currently suffers from a legitimacy crisis in the eyes of the Turks, and in recent years Turkey has ceased to define its membership in NATO through nonnegotiable identity-related lenses. As Alliance members have been at odds with each other about how to define NATO’s purpose moving forward, and as NATO has become a more global and less European organization, Turkish decision-makers are finding it difficult to believe that membership in NATO supports Turkey’s Western European identity anymore. In a radical turnabout, Turkey has embarked on a process to build its relations with NATO on the basis of more pragmatic, and less enduring, common interests and concerns. How long those binding common interests endure, however, remains to be seen. The need for European allies to rely on Turkey’s security cooperation has decreased since the Cold War, while Turkey’s security has simultaneously become increasingly exposed to challenges from the Middle East. Ankara had perceived its security in the context of conventional threats and valued NATO mainly for its Article V commitments (Article V states that an armed attack against one or more NATO members is considered an attack on them all), but European members of the Alliance have tried their best not to get involved in non-European contingencies. The majority of the European allies have continued to focus their attention on intra-European affairs, and prioritized the European Union as the most appropriate organizational platform for dealing with them. Europeans have increasingly considered Turkey as part of the Middle Eastern security architecture.4 Two occasions in the recent past have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether European members of the Alliance would continue to see Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities. Both took place because of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. In both 1991 and 2003, Turkey asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to its territory to guard against the possibility of any Iraqi attack. Both times, some European members of the Alliance hesitated to respond positively to Turkey’s appeals. Although it is true that those European allies were generally against the possibility of NATO-ization of the 2003 U.S.-led war in Iraq, their resistance to calls to strengthen Turkey’s defense capabilities vis-a`-vis Iraq’s ballistic missiles suggest that they did not recognize Turkey’s security perceptions.

### Admonishment – NB Solvency – 2NC

#### US response must take a hardline stance against Turkey taking advantage of their NATO allies

Armbruster 21 (Natalie Armbruster, foreign policy research associate at Defense Priorities focusing on the Middle East and North Africa, “Turkey is Becoming a Problem for NATO—the U.S. Should Pay Attention,” Newsweek, 10/8/21, https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-becoming-problem-nato-us-should-pay-attention-opinion-1636810//eo

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently met in Sochi to discuss military operations in northwestern Syria. While on opposing sides in Syria, before the talks, Erdogan nevertheless described Turkish military cooperation with Russia as "of utmost importance," alluding to what the U.S. already knows: Turkey does not feel constrained by its NATO responsibilities. It will not hesitate to pursue the path most closely aligned with its own interests, no matter where it lies: in the West or Russia. The U.S. can learn something from this shrewd and unashamed realpolitik. In 2019, after years of toeing the line between cozy relations with Russia and the West, Turkey appeared to put the death knell in its NATO credibility, purchasing Russian-made S-400 defense systems, booting Turkey from the F-35 joint strike fighter program. The White House released a statement on the decision claiming that Turkey's purchase rendered "continued involvement with the F-35 impossible" as "the F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform." However, officials such as Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho) were far more candid about the purchase's implications. "This is not some minor dustup with this country," he said. "They've thumbed their nose at us, and they've thumbed their nose at their other NATO allies." The U.S. has sanctioned Turkey and urged Erdogan to reverse the decision. Erdogan doubled down before the Sochi meetings: "It is not possible for us to turn back from the steps we took. ... It is of great importance for us to continue by strengthening Turkey-Russia relations every day." Turkey has chosen its trajectory. The U.S. should adjust its behavior accordingly and stop treating its NATO alliances as sacrosanct when Turkey clearly does not view the relationship similarly. Turkey, despite having the second-largest standing military force in NATO, is inching toward a point where it becomes a possible liability, instead of an asset. While not discounting the points of tension in Syria and Libya, the most glaring flashpoint for possible conflict is Turkey's enduring commitment to the defense of Azerbaijan against Armenia, through training Azerbaijani officers and supplying military equipment. Should a conflict erupt once more, it would be between Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia, presenting the potential for Turkey to, once again, be at odds with the Russian military and call for NATO aid or assistance. Even among NATO allies themselves, Turkey has fanned the flames of conflict, with Erdogan becoming more and more aggressive in the Mediterranean. In 2020, Turkey disregarded a U.N.-enforced arms embargo around Libya and responded with hostility when confronted by French patrols. Greco-Turkish tensions in the Aegean almost erupted into war in the same year after Greek and Turkish frigates nearly collided over drilling disputes, forcing the U.S. to step in and push for de-escalation and negotiations. Nevertheless, among these hostilities, Turkey has been left relatively unscathed by its NATO allies. As Turkey continues to stoke the fires of ongoing tensions, the U.S. must make clear that it will not fight Erdogan's wars under the obligation of NATO defense if these disputes erupt beyond Erdogan's control. Continued concessions and aid to U.S. partners, for simply being allies, are why American allies like Turkey have abused and taken advantage of these leniencies and strayed away from American interests. Alliances are not meant to be treated as sacred bonds of a covenant. They are formed to recognize parallel interests and commit to jointly serving those interests. NATO was formed to support European nations who wanted to counter the influence and might of Moscow and provide a unified defense against the now dissolved Soviet Union. If these same NATO allies are now flirting with Putin unapologetically, the U.S. should adjust the extent of its obligation to those whose interests lie opposite of American interests. The U.S. should rethink its responsibility of perpetual European defense and stop serving allies like Turkey their cake on a platter so that they can both have it and eat it too.

#### NATO needs to create policies that exclude Turkey to ensure that Turkey does not continue gathering support from the West

Ghosh 22 (Bobby Ghosh, Bloomberg columnist covering foreign affairs and previous international editor at Time, “US Should Brace for More Pushback From Erdogan,” The Washington Post, 6/20/22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-should-brace-for-more-pushback-from-erdogan/2022/06/17/88e89f1e-ee03-11ec-9f90-79df1fb28296\_story.html//eo)

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has kicked off Turkey’s campaign season by confirming that elections will be held next June — and that he will seek to extend his rule into a third decade. “Now, I am saying that I am the candidate of the People’s Alliance,” he told supporters in the Aegean port city of Izmir last week. He was referring to the ruling coalition of his AK Party and the nationalist MHP. Turkey’s allies and rivals, along with Turks themselves, might want to buckle up for 12 months of turbulence. The US and Europe should brace themselves for even more mudslinging and contrariness from Erdogan at a time when they need his cooperation in containing Russian adventurism. Ornery in the best of times, Erdogan has grown even more quarrelsome with the West as he has become politically vulnerable at home. His fortunes are now at their lowest ebb since he first took the reins in Ankara in 2003. He and his party have slipped in opinion polls over the past couple of years, as Turkey’s economy has been hammered by a combination of the pandemic and the president’s economic policies. Although the lira has tanked and inflation has soared, Erdogan has stubbornly resisted calls to raise interest rates. “Turkey is again stuck in a vicious cycle. High inflation causes the lira to weaken, which results in even higher inflation” said Ziad Daoud, chief emerging markets economist at Bloomberg Economics. “Lifting interest rates would break this cycle, but that’s unlikely to happen.” With little prospect of an economic turnaround in time for the vote, the president must find other ways to make his case for re-election. All the early signs are that he will dip into the old populist’s playbook, appealing to ethno-nationalism at home and raising alarms about foreign enemies — real and imagined. Some of his favorite bogeymen are now out of bounds: Turkey’s economic troubles have forced Erdogan to make nice with the Gulf Arab states he used to pillory, to popular acclaim. He can’t very well portray the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as perfidious reactionaries while pleading with them for investment and trade deals. Erdogan has also softened his rhetoric against Israel, thanks in no small part to a friendship he has struck with President Isaac Herzog. This leaves him with one familiar fall guy: the West. He has already begun to ratchet up his rhetoric against the US and Europe. In a carefully choreographed meeting with young Turks last week, he denounced the West as mendacious and untrustworthy. He has lashed out at another old bugbear, demanding that Greece demilitarize islands in the Aegean Sea, adding that he was “not joking.” In the months ahead, expect Erdogan to build on the general themes of Western duplicitousness and to double down on his conspiracy theory that Turkey’s woes are the result of a deliberate campaign by “global barons of politics and money.” Turks groaning under the twin burdens of inflation and currency depreciation will be encouraged to blame the US and the Europe rather than their president. In addition to using progressively more astringent rhetoric, the president will be less cooperative in his dealings with the West. We’re already seeing this in his refusal to budge on NATO expansion: By framing his objection to Sweden and Finland as a matter of national security (he accuses them of harboring Kurdish terrorists) Erdogan is exaggerating the threat as well as portraying his recalcitrance as patriotic resistance in the face of foreign bullying. There is no point in expecting reasonableness from any politician who has their back to the wall, and certainly not from one who has decided intransigence is in his best interest. As frustrating as it will be for President Biden and European leaders, they should recognize where Erdogan is coming from, and act accordingly. Threats won’t work since they will only play into his narrative of heroic defiance. Their best bet might be to signal to him that if Turkey won’t join the consensus, they will devise workarounds. This may require the NATO powers to build a separate security architecture for Sweden and Finland outside the alliance — at least until next summer, when they will either be dealing with a new Turkish president or with a victorious Erdogan who no longer needs them as bogeymen.

### AT: Turkey K2 NATO Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

#### Turkey is the biggest roadblock to NATO cooperation and advancement

Crowler & Erlanger (Crowley, diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau, writer for the NYTimes; Erlanger, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for the NYTimes, “For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html)

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member. Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy. “These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time. It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory. The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine. But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016. He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support. “In my four years there, it was quite often 27 against one,” said Ivo H. Daalder, a U.S. ambassador to NATO during the Obama administration, when the alliance had 28 members. Mr. Erdogan’s objections to the membership of Sweden and Finland have even renewed questions about whether NATO might be better off without Turkey.

#### Turkey is far from aligned with NATO and its allies

Mahmoud 22 (Nervana Mahmoud, British Egyptian regional observer and independent commentator on Middle East affairs, “Turkey and Nato are no longer aligned, even if they won't admit it,” TheNationalNews, 6/30/22, https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/turkey-and-nato-are-no-longer-aligned-even-if-they-won-t-admit-it-1.1242583//eo

Following the accession of Turkey to Nato in 1952, the newly elected Turkish leader at the time, Adnan Menderes, expressed his desire for his government to be the western military alliance’s “backbone”. Nearly 70 years later, Turkey has changed fundamentally. Out of the 30 members of Nato, Turkey is one of the oldest, but now the most isolated. The long-awaited meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Joe Biden at the latest Nato summit this week was, in a nutshell, an anti-climax. Turkey once had unconditional loyalty to Nato, and used its strategic location to prove its importance to the organisation. In 1955, it joined the Baghdad Pact, a Nato-backed regional alliance with Britain, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, aimed at preventing a Soviet Union infiltration of the Middle East. The next year, Turkey stood by Britain against Egypt during the Suez crisis. Simon Smith, in his book Reassessing Suez 1956, wrote that Menderes's government did not regard the Suez Canal dispute as a bilateral problem between the UK and Egypt, but one that concerned Nato's entire strategy. Menderes argued: "Turkey is convinced that the UK is acting as a guardian of one of the key positions of the free world." Under the leadership of Mr Erdogan, however, Turkey has turned 180 degrees away from its unified accord with its Nato allies. Turkey, like other non-western members of the bygone Baghdad Pact, Iran and Pakistan, has adopted its own version of Islamist nationalism, while demonstrating degrees of suspicion and hostility towards the western world. It is no secret that this year’s Nato summit in Brussels was held against a backdrop of a long list of flashpoints between Turkey and other Nato members, and ambiguous relations with the alliance’s chief competitors, Russia and China. In 2017, Turkey brokered a deal worth billions with Russian President Putin for the S-400 mobile surface-to-air missile system. It forced the administration of then US president Donald Trump, one of the friendliest US administrations towards Erdogan’s Turkey, to impose sanctions on Ankara last year. The thorny dispute continued as Mr Trump’s presidency wound down, and has since forced Mr Biden’s administration to exclude Turkey from the new F35 consortium agreement. Turkey has turned 180 degrees away from its unified accord with its Nato allies In addition to the S-400 and F35 disputes, the US and Turkey disagree on a long list of issues, including US support for Kurdish militias in Syria and the Biden administration’s formal acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide. On the human rights front, the White House issued a strongly worded statement following Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention on preventing domestic violence against women. Moreover, Turkey has had tense relations with Greece, France and Cyprus. Last year, Turkey came close to a naval confrontation with Greece in disputed Eastern Mediterranean waters over Turkey’s gas exploration activities near the Greek island of Kastellorizo. Relations with France are not any better. Last year, the French frigate, the Courbet, tried to stop Turkish arms smuggling to Libya, forcing Nato to investigate the incident. Furthermore, the two countries have been engaged in wars of words – Mr Erdogan called for a boycott of French products after French President Emmanuel Macron firmly upheld the right of cartoonists to depict religious figures. As for Cyprus, Turkey insists on the continued division of the country, contradicting the stances taken by Europe and the US on the issue. As if all the above is not bad enough for its relations with its supposed allies, Turkey raised eyebrows when it pushed Nato members into watering down its official reaction to Belarus’s recent forced landing of a passenger plane in order to detain a dissident journalist. In face of all of those challenging disagreements, Turkey approached this year’s Nato summit with a multifaceted strategy to engage in a charm offensive, defiance, and spin. Ahead of the Brussels meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu made conciliatory statements to Paris, Athens and Washington. Mr Cavusoglu subsequently visited both Greece and France, and insisted that Turkey and France should maintain stable ties as "allies". In Athens, a cheerful Mr Cavusoglu and his Greek counterpart, Nikos Dendias, agreed to “continue co-operation on a positive agenda to resolve pending bilateral issues”. Furthermore, to prove its importance to Nato, Turkey has offered to run the main airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, despite the Taliban militant group condemning the proposal. Turkey has long-standing naval ties with European powers, but relations have become strained. Reuters At the summit, there were, as expected, no breakthroughs, with none of the big issues poisoning ties between the Nato allies getting resolved. The meeting was not even followed by a published read-out, but Mr Erdogan described it as "fruitful and sincere". That description that may convince his fans at home, but the Turkish lira was not impressed – it fell against the dollar after the talks. Mr Erdogan’s uncompromising stance on the S-400 front will undoubtedly serve as a major obstacle to any joint military co-operation between the US and Turkey in the future. There is a saying that one who rides two horses at once will split asunder. That sums up the current affairs of Mr Erdogan’s Turkey, which rides the horse of Ottoman Islamist revisionism, but still clings to the Nato club and its prestigious advantages. That dualism has dispossessed Turkey of the trust of many fellow Nato members as well as anti-extremist regimes in the Arab world. It is rather ironic that the Mr Erdogan, who claims to consider former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes a hero, has deviated so much from Menderes’s policies. Menderes went out of his way, even supporting a colonial Britain, to cement Turkey firmly within Nato. Mr Erdogan appears to have gone out of his way to set Turkey adrift in the opposite direction. Mr Erdogan’s supporters in Turkey, however, should consider themselves lucky. Analysts and observers who hoped for a firm handling of Turkey’s troubled policies have been disappointed by the outcome of this year’s Nato summit. Calls for cutting the Gordian knot with Turkey are widely vocalised, but Mr Biden, who is trying his best to disengage from the Middle East and focus on his country’s pressing domestic issues, appears to think that doing so would be a drastic move – particularly amid a challenging pandemic and strong appetite in his administration to maintain transatlantic unity. In Brussels, Mr Biden and Mr Erdogan have maintained the veneer of unity, but the door for healing the rifts between Turkey and Nato also seems to be firmly closed. Sooner or later, all of the thorny issues will resurface again. Nonetheless, solving the Turkish conundrum may be postponed until another Nato summit.

Turkey may be kicked out of NATO or not get assistance from NATO

Carbonaro 22, Giulia Carbonaro, Producer and journalist for Newsweek, “Could Turkey Be Expelled From NATO Over Blocking Finland, Sweden?”, Newsweek, 05/20/22, https://www.newsweek.com/could-turkey-expelled-nato-over-blocking-finland-sweden-1708532//AB

Ankara's objection could prove a real challenge towards a possible Finland and Sweden entry into the alliance, as [NATO](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/nato) [requires unanimous approval](https://www.newsweek.com/turkey-will-block-sweden-finland-joining-nato-1708108) from all its members to accept new members. So how's NATO going to respond to a member state that once again is proving an inconvenient, uneasy ally?

Turkey has blocked the start of talks over Finland and Sweden's NATO membership. Above, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan delivers a speech during his party's group meeting at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara, on May 18, 2022. GETTY

It's not the first time there's talks of kicking Turkey out of the alliance.

The idea was first suggested in 2016 when Turkish president [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/recep-tayyip-erdogan)cracked down on the opposition after a failed coup. It was then brought up again in 2019 when Turkey invaded northeastern Syria. NATO allies reacted with horror and concern at the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the country, with Sweden and Finland imposing sanctions on Ankara that are still in place.

At the time, U.S. Senator [Lindsey Graham](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/lindsey-graham) suggested Turkey's membership in NATO should have been suspended, if Turkish troops attacked the Kurdish forces who had helped the U.S. destroy the [ISIS](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/isis) Caliphate.

But the North Atlantic Treaty regulating NATO does not have an option to suspend or even expel members. But there's the possibility to do something to the same effect when a member state persistently violates the principles contained in the pact—by failing to safeguard the freedom of its people, the country's democracy and the rule of law. In that case, NATO members can unanimously decide to stop assisting that ally.

But would NATO go as far in response to Turkey's refusal to approve Finland and Sweden's bid for membership?

**Turkey currently lowers NATO and EU credibility with relations to Russia**

**Kogan 18** (Eugene Kogan, held research fellowships at Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish National Defence College, and the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Was a researcher for Harvard. Russian-Turkish Relations and their Impact on NATO and the EU, European Security and Defense. 6-26-18. <http://gpf-europe.com/upload/esd_02-2018-2-30-32_kogan.pdf>) – ED

The Black Sea region is one of the re- gions in which Turkey has lost its influ- ence to Russia. NATO and the EU have no influence on relations between Rus- sia and Turkey, as the Presidents of both countries either ignore the EU's efforts or, as in the case of Erdogan, despise their at- tempts to appease him. In addition, NATO has no mechanism for excluding Turkey as a member state. Although the EU has implicitly suspended negotiations on Tur- key's possible EU membership, it is not prepared to make a clear statement that Turkey will not join the Union in the fore- seeable future. The leaders of both organ- izations continue to hope that Erdogan will change the authoritarian course of the country and return to a European way and reconsider the comfortable relations with Putin. Erdogan has other plans, and as a result the leaders of NATO and the EU are likely to wait in vain. It must be emphasised that Erdogan was and is not an equal partner in the Turkish– Russian relationship, although both Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Er- dogan have a similarly authoritarian style of government. Erdogan called Putin "my dear friend Vladimir" at a press confer- ence in St. Petersburg on 9 August 2016, shortly after the restoration of bilateral relations, which were damaged by a Turk- ish F-16 fighter plane on 24 November 2015 after the launch of a Russian Su-24 bomber. But Putin did not call Erdogan "my dear friend" Tayyip. There is a saying that Russia has no friends. As the Russian Tsar Alexander III previously said: has only two allies – the army and the navy." And in the 21st century, Russia also has nuclear deterrence and the right of veto in the UN Security Council. It can therefore be said that Putin does not regard Erdogan as a friend, but as an unequal counterpart. In addition, Murat Bilhan, former head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Strategic Re- search Centre, said: "Behind Putin's smile, Russia remains a great state and can show its talons whenever it suits him. Turkey could never compete with Russia. Russia is a superpower, while Turkey is a regional power." Turkey should not be under any illusions about its role in relations, namely that of the second fiddle. While Erdogan's authoritarian rule has alienated allies in Europe and the United States, it has strengthened Putin's control over Turkey and embarrassed Erdogan. Pu- tin's economic sanctions against Turkey in November 2015 caused serious damage to the Turkish economy when Russian tour- ists stayed away from Turkey. Putin can im- pose these economic sanctions and travel Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with representatives of the Russian Defence Ministry to discuss Russian “counter-terrorism operations” in Syria. On 13 November 2017, Vladimir Putin met with President of Turkey Re- cep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi to discuss bilateral relations and current issues on the international agenda. 28 European Security & Defence · March 2018 Photo: Kremlin.ru Photo: Kremlin.ru have received unconditional support from Russia. The cost of unconditional support from Russia remains high and has a long- term impact. In addition, the renewed co- operation between Ankara and Moscow is to take place on Russian terms, and Turkey reluctantly accepts this reality." The never-ending story of Erdogan's deci- sion to buy the S-400 air defence system from Russia is an example of Putin's view of Moscow's support for Turkey. Turkey buys a system that is not compatible with NATO standards and cannot be integrated into NATO's air defence system. That is why Turkey must confine itself to its own archi- tecture. Even if Russia is ready to carry out maintenance work, maintenance is carried out by Russian and not by Turkish workers. At the same time, Russia is not prepared to supply software codes, IFF systems, joint production with Turkey and certainly no technology transfer to Turkey. And this de- spite the Turkish side's persistence to gain access to the software codes and the IFF system. In addition, the system cannot be delivered to Turkey before 2020. This is a high price paid by Turkey for unconditional support from Russia. The statement by Ca- SECURITY POLICY  restrictions on Turkey if he feels that Er- dogan is not listening to him. In addition, Putin can impose sanctions at any time and without warning, which he can promise. Therefore, the relationship is one of senior and junior partners, even though Erdogan does not see this reality. But as Atilla Yesi- lada of Global Source Partners, a consul- tancy firm based in Istanbul, said in January 2017: "The Turkish government has com- pletely decoupled itself from reality. This is not the case with Putin, who is playing a tough, well-calculated and manipulative game against Erdogan and at the same time knows how to deal with the volatile Erdogan correctly, compared to the rather timid attitude of Turkey's Western allies." There is no doubt that Turkey did not only push itself into Russian orbit in 2015, but al- ready in 2008, because Turkey was already dependent on 60 percent of gas supplies from Russia at that time. Today, the figure is 55 percent. Turkey has no choice but to rely on Russia's good will, and Turkey pays in hard currency. The idea that Turkey must diversify its gas imports away from Russia and become a gas hub has remained an idea. In 2014, according to Turkey's foreign trade statistics, exports to Russia amount- ed to US$5.9Bn, while imports from Rus- sia amounted to US$25.2Bn. The first six months of 2016 were Turkey's worst export result since 2004, and the most striking as- pect of trade with Russia is that it has been in favour of Russia from the outset. Russia sells more to Turkey than Turkey sells to Russia. Turkey's dependence on Russian gas and oil (10 percent of oil comes from Russia) is a major factor in this imbalance. The current situation is unlikely to change, as Turkey's energy requirements will dou- ble in the next decade. Another factor in this imbalance is the increasing number of Russian tourists in Turkey. In addition to Turkey's dependence on Rus- sian gas and Russian tourists, the Russian- Georgian war in August 2008 sent a clear message to Ankara, namely that Ankara can only increase its influence in its imme- diate neighbourhood, namely in the Black Sea region, by coordinating with Moscow and not with its NATO allies. And that is exactly what has happened since then. Turkey's failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016 has further consolidated relations between Russia and Turkey. In a telephone call with Erdogan on 17 July 2016, Putin stressed the "categorical inadmissibility of anti-consti- tutional acts and violence in state life" and reaffirmed his intention to meet Erdogan in Russia. Putin's reaction was in stark con- trast to that of the Western allies. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 25 July 2016: "Unlike other countries, we A Russian S-400 Air Defence System on a BAZ trailer chassis On 24 November 2015, a Turkish F-16 fighter aircraft shot down a Rus- sian Su-24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. The Turkish Air Force claimed that the Russian aircraft violated Turkish airspace. The Russian pilot Capt. Konstantin Murakhtin said on Russian TV there was "no way" the jet could have violated Turkish airspace. Turkey says the pilots were warned 10 times before the plane was shot down. Capt. Murakhtin was rescued from rebel-held territory in Syria in a 12-hour operation involving Russian Special Forces. The incident strained Russian-Turkish relations. March 2018 · European Security & Defence 29 Graphics: Donor Furfur, Wikipedia CC Photo: Vitaly Kuzmin, Wikipedia CC vusoglu that "Ankara can refuse to buy the S-400 if Moscow refuses to stop joint production in Turkey on 9 October 2017" should be taken with a grain of salt. Cavusoglu is not the one who decided to buy the S-400. Cavusoglu's attempt to put the Russians under pressure is not taken seriously by Moscow and the Russians laugh behind Cavusoglu's back. After all, the Turkish cash deposit of around US$100M for the purchase of the S-400 will not be repaid. Finally, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, said on 25 October 2017: "Although the principle of sovereignty obviously consists in the procurement of defence equipment, as the nations are sovereign in decision-making, they are also sovereign in coping with the consequences of this decision.” It remains to be seen whether Pavel's statement can be interpreted as an explicit warning to Erdogan, but it is obvious that NATO is not satisfied with Erdogan's decision to buy the S-400. The unequal bilateral relations are a major headache for NATO and the EU, as relations between Turkey and its Western allies have deteriorated since the failed coup d'état in Turkey. Let us recall the state of bilateral relations between Germany and Tur- key, and in particular the USA and Turkey, as well as the bitter relations between Austria and The Netherlands and Turkey. It is obvious that relations between Turkey and its Western allies will not change as long as Erdogan remains president. Although Turkey remains an ally of NATO, Turkey has become a difficult ally. Erdogan is fully aware of this fact and will not change his behaviour, making the NATO and EU response difficult. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's polite statement that Turk- ish officials told him that "Ankara remains a strong NATO ally" is without substance. Erdogan is acting in bad faith, knowing that Western allies cannot punish Turkey in the present circumstances. On the other hand, Putin behaves like a spectator and enjoys the confusion without moving a finger. As long as NATO does not succeed in including an article on the right of expulsion and penalties for misconduct of a member of NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty, Erdogan will continue to be- have boldly. As long as the EU heads of state and government dis- agree on the fate of Turkey's possible membership and therefore do not take a unanimous decision, Erdogan will treat these heads of state and government with contempt. It is an opportunity for Putin to bind the Turkish Gulliver to the land of the Lilliputians, to continue his policy of changing the military balance in the Black Sea region (with intensive militarisation of the Crimean peninsula) in his favour and to scorn the NATO alliance.NATO and the EU are in an unprofitable position because of consensus and compromise, while Putin and Erdogan continue to behave with impunity, knowing the internal weaknesses of the EU, which is unable to make a final decision on Turkey's EU membership. As long as NATO's language remains vague and ambiguous, Erdogan will not do anything to shake NATO's boat, but will enjoy the protection of NATO and Russia's embrace. Whether the Turkish formula of NATO protection and Russian embrace can also apply to other NATO member states goes beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it can be said that other NATO members are carefully evaluating the Turkish experience. Putin will continue to draw Turkey into its sphere of influence by offering smaller trade, energy and tourism concessions and with the unresolved conflict in Syria, as Erdogan is also in an unprofitable position. The author can only repeat what Bilhan said above: "Behind Putin's smile Russia remains a great state and can show its claws whenever it suits it." And this is something that Erdogan and his government should remember well.

### AT: Turkey K2 Security Co-op – Solvency – 2NC

#### 5 key crises and a diverging relationship between U.S. and Turkey prove true security cooperation can never be achieved- Turkey is actively breaking relationships with the West

Dalay 21 (Galip Dalay, Research Director, has written multiple pieces on Turkey, NATO, and US relations, specializes on Turkey relations and Middle Eastern affairs,”US-Turkey relations will remain crisis-ridden for a long time to come,” Brookings, 1-29-22, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/29/us-turkey-relations-will-remain-crisis-ridden-for-a-long-time-to-come/)//nehahahahha

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has a long history of complexities, with no golden era to point to. However, even by these standards, recent years have been exceptionally bad. An accumulated series of crises, a dysfunctional framework for the relationship, and diverging threat perceptions have plagued ties. In particular, five crises that have tested U.S.-Turkey relations in recent years are likely to be on the Biden administration’s agenda: Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense systems and the ensuing U.S. sanctions on Turkey, the Syrian Kurds, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, the court case against Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank related to U.S. sanctions on Iran, and Biden’s views on Turkey’s democratic regression. Despite this long list of disputes, former President Trump shielded Turkey from many possible punitive actions. In this regard, his departure bodes ill for Ankara. In his confirmation hearing on January 19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Turkey as our “so-called strategic partner” in response to a question on Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems; this is indicative of the new administration’s mood toward Turkey. In the same vein, in almost all public opinion polls in Turkey, the United States tops the list of countries that people perceive to threaten Turkey’s national security. Zooming out, in spite of recent positive messaging from Ankara, the crisis in Turkey’s relations with the broader West are set to worsen. This will be evident in divergent readings of international affairs, Turkey’s quest to reduce dependency on the West, and different ideas of what a “reset” would look like.

# AFF

## Deficits/Turns

### Russian Deterrence

#### Turkey can be cooperative and is key to deterring Russia

Jeffrey 22 (James Jeffrey, Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, “The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship,” Wilson Center, 6/15/22, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-accession-crisis-risks-final-collapse-alliance-turkey-relationship//eo>)

Turkey’s rejection of NATO accession for Sweden and Finland, beyond undercutting NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression, reflects a deeper rift between the West and Turkey. This is further manifest by Ankara’s recent threat to expand into northern Syria and its overflights of Greek territory. For the sake of the Alliance, immediate responses are vital, but the rift will worsen unless Washington and European capitals work with Ankara to fundamentally shift their relationship. While such a shift has long been advisable given Turkey’s importance, the existential threat of Russian aggression for both Turkey and the Alliance make it urgent. Almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK. A month ago, Washington hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu and signaled a new bilateral strategic dialogue. This included possible sales of F-16’s to Ankara, symbolically ending the bitter dispute over a Turkish Russian missile purchase, and Washington’s subsequent cutting Turkey from the F-35 program. Turkey was also following analogous rapprochement with Arab states, Israel, Greece, and Armenia, and now plays a central role in the Ukrainian conflict providing weapons, closing the Straits to Russian naval reinforcements and pressing on various diplomatic exchanges. Then almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK, and followed up with the aforementioned threats in Syria and escalation in the Aegean. Predictably, American commentators reacted vigorously, even suggesting once again for Turkey to be thrown out of NATO. Shifting attitudes toward Turkey Such dramatic flips in Turkish policy, gelding any predictable diplomacy, have become a hallmark of both Turkish president Erdogan and the convoluted internal political system with his party, dependent on an extremist nationalist partner. Such flips also make efforts to resolve issues such as those above (let alone the underlying rift between Ankara and NATO allies), a high-risk endeavor which most Western leaders avoid, writing Turkey off as a lost cause. But as Ukraine has demonstrated, Turkey is vital to containing Russia, as it has been to NATO’s nuclear deterrence, missile defense against Iran, operations in the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It is just too big, too important, and at times too problematic to ignore. While the Ukraine conflict is now generating strife between Turkey and NATO over Scandinavian accession, it also offers a chance to improve relations between them. That conflict resembles nothing seen since the late 1930s and immediate post-war period, with the very survival of the world order at stake. Winning this conflict, by maintaining Ukraine’s survival as an independent state and deterring new Russian aggression, while avoiding escalation into the unknown, is a categorical imperative not experienced since the Cold War. While this is true of the Alliance as a whole, it is especially relevant for Turkey, a front line state with a long history under Russian pressure. Furthermore, experience shows Turkey can be cooperative. The Bush administration worked well with Turkey on counter-PKK operations, and the Obama administration negotiated a NATO anti- Iranian ballistic missile radar deployment. The 2019 Pence-Erdogan ceasefire in Northeast Syria still holds despite Turkish threats, and the two capitals handled well President Biden’s acknowledgment of Armenian genocide. And, ironically, despite deep geostrategic hostility and recent military clashes, Russia and Turkey maintain productive presidential-level relations, with Putin and especially Erdogan usually following a ‘no-surprises’ principle. The Turks understand that accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is critically important for a positive Ukraine outcome. The Turks understand that accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is critically important for a positive Ukraine outcome. They know it would strengthen the West’s long-term against Russian aggression and underline the solidarity of the international front against Moscow, without, as Putin admitted, directly threatening Russia. But what Ankara may not get is that its penchant for dangerous haggling, not only over accession but with its Aegean and northern Syria threats, undercuts that solidarity and the whole Russia containment categorical imperative. Turkey would then be blamed and likely ostracized permanently within NATO. So, the question is, why does it keep running such risks?

#### NATO requires Turkish support to deter Russian efforts in the Black Sea

Tol and Isik 21 (Gönül Tol, professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies; Yörük Isik, geopolitical analyst based in Instanbul; “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot”, Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot)

When it comes to Turkey-NATO ties, Ankara is regarded as more of a problem than an ally these days. Not only did it purchase a Russian S-400 air defense system, but its gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean also raised the specter of military conflict between NATO allies when Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly toward each other this past summer. There is one region, however, where Turkey can help NATO efforts: the Black Sea.

Since its annexation in 2014, the Crimean Peninsula has become a Russian military fortress. Moscow has significantly increased its military presence in a region that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the centerpiece of Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean. It has now enough assets, reinforced with new [ships](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1047869183768317952?s=20) and [submarines](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1110869857157943297?s=20) with powerful Kalibr missile systems, to overwhelm any coalition in these waters. But Moscow wants more. In 2021, the Russian army will receive almost 3,500 pieces of new equipment, and two-thirds of the military budget will go toward purchases of armaments and upgrades. This includes the Ministry of Defense’s latest Strategiya automatic surface surveillance system in the Black Sea.

A growing American presence and a new Turkish strategy In response, the [U.S. Navy has stepped up its own military presence in the Black Sea](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1354842068519161863?s=20). In the last two weeks, the USS Donald Cook and the USS Porter, guided missile destroyers, and the USNS Laramie, a refueling ship, entered the Black Sea in what has been the largest deployment in the region since 2017. Both destroyers are armed with Raytheon Tomahawk cruise missiles, bringing real firepower to the Black Sea theater. The U.S. Navy’s appearance is an unmistakable show of force, demonstrating that it can operate in a wide geography and without help from regional allies, if necessary.America’s presence in the Black Sea is important to check Russian expansionism, but a more effective strategy calls for a coordinated response from regional allies such as Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the U.S. in particular has been rocky of late. Ignoring warnings from NATO and the threat of sanctions from the U..S, Turkey went ahead with its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, taking delivery of the first shipment in mid-2019. But despite its growing defense partnership with Moscow, Ankara is equally uneasy about the growing Russian military presence in a region where Turkey once had the edge. In a 2016 plea to Turkey’s NATO allies, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and called for a greater NATO presence, reversing a decades-old Turkish policy of keeping the alliance out.

Turkey has developed a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russian influence in the Black Sea. One important leg of that strategy is on the home front, where Turkey is strengthening its navy. A project called MILGEM, a contraction of the Turkish for “national ship” (milli gemi), was launched to design and construct naval vessels in-country, including ADA class corvettes. In 2018, the [Pakistani Navy signed a contract](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1178795282798202880?s=20) to acquire four of these ships from Turkey’s state-run defense contractor ASFAT, the first successful export of these vessels. Turkey has also been building up its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea by ordering four new frigates, called both Istanbul and MILGEM II. The frigates are based on the ADA class corvette design but extended by 14 meters to enable the inclusion of a vertical launching system for surface to air missiles. The naval version of the army’s[Korkut](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/970694646216249345?s=20) low-altitude air defense system, Gökdeniz, will be added to the inventory for the first time with the frigate. The national [Atmaca](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1191311364343681024?s=20) anti-ship missile will also be integrated into the first unit of the class, TCG Istanbul, which is forecast for entry into service later this year. Balancing Russia through regional military cooperation Turkey is taking steps on the foreign policy front as well, stepping up its cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Ankara views these countries as instrumental in its efforts to balance the Russian military presence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkish-Ukrainian relations have expanded significantly. Last year, Erdoğan unveiled a $36 million military aid package for Ukraine. The two countries agreed to cooperate on the design and manufacture of aircraft engines, radar units, [drones](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1108309446034423808?s=20), and navigation systems and consider collaboration on advanced technology projects, such as ballistic missile systems. Turkey also plans to sell its ships to Ukraine as part of a much bigger defense deal, which, if it comes to fruition, could change the balance of power in the Black Sea. Besides cooperation in defense industries, the Ukrainian and Turkish navies also [conduct](https://www.newsweek.com/estranged-russia-turkey-and-ukraine-join-forces-447473) joint training in the Black Sea to showcase their ability to operate "in accordance with NATO standards." Turkey has also invested in shoring up the defenses of Georgia, another Black Sea country threatened by Russia’s growing influence in the region. Turkey has [allocated](https://turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/652-turkey%E2%80%99s-commitment-to-azerbaijan%E2%80%99s-defense-shows-the-limits-of-ankara%E2%80%99s-tilt-to-moscow.html) millions of dollars to the Georgian Ministry of Defense to reform the country’s military logistics and transfer defense capabilities to its northeastern neighbor while advocating for the extension of NATO membership to Georgia, a move Russia opposes. Turkey’s defense cooperation with Azerbaijan has been growing as well, which was on full display in the fighting in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh late last year, when Ankara threw its full military support behind Baku. Turkish drones provided Azerbaijan a huge advantage in the conflict, which ended with Azerbaijan capturing significant swathes of territory from Armenian forces. Turkey’s military exports to Azerbaijan rose six-fold in 2020, with Azerbaijan jumping to the top of the list of Turkish arms buyers in September. NATO and the Black Sea NATO should support these Turkish efforts. It should also establish a permanent “Black Sea Maritime Patrol” group modeled on the successful Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian is a flexible effort that can potentially cover the full range of NATO’s maritime security needs. In accordance with NATO’s “framework nation” concept, Turkey can be assigned the leading nation role in the Black Sea and smaller members can integrate their own, more limited capabilities into an organizational structure provided by Ankara. Mirroring other NATO missions in the Baltic or Mediterranean, Turkey can play a coordinating role to bring in other NATO allies willing to participate and provide support. Such a force would require NATO’s coordination and political pressure among non-Black Sea members to commit in advance to a regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea, in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the presence of warships from non-littoral states to a maximum of 21 days. Although the development of such a multinational unit would require a sustained diplomatic effort, once active, it would boost NATO’s deterrence in a strategic region that has become a springboard for Russia to project power from Georgia all the way to Syria and Libya.

#### NATO requires Turkish support to deter Russian efforts in the Black Sea

Tol and Isik 21 (Gönül Tol, professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies; Yörük Isik, geopolitical analyst based in Instanbul; “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot”, Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot)

When it comes to Turkey-NATO ties, Ankara is regarded as more of a problem than an ally these days. Not only did it purchase a Russian S-400 air defense system, but its gunboat diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean also raised the specter of military conflict between NATO allies when Greek and Turkish naval flotillas steamed directly toward each other this past summer. There is one region, however, where Turkey can help NATO efforts: the Black Sea.

Since its annexation in 2014, the Crimean Peninsula has become a Russian military fortress. Moscow has significantly increased its military presence in a region that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the centerpiece of Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean. It has now enough assets, reinforced with new [ships](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1047869183768317952?s=20) and [submarines](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1110869857157943297?s=20) with powerful Kalibr missile systems, to overwhelm any coalition in these waters. But Moscow wants more. In 2021, the Russian army will receive almost 3,500 pieces of new equipment, and two-thirds of the military budget will go toward purchases of armaments and upgrades. This includes the Ministry of Defense’s latest Strategiya automatic surface surveillance system in the Black Sea.

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### International Co-op

#### Turkey is key in international cooperation with NATO for emerging technologies, AI, and biotechnology – several benefits to keeping Turkey

THO No date (Turkey Heritage Organization, organization that promotes discussion and dialogue around Turkey’s role in the international community and issues of importance in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship, as well as an analysis of the NATO alliance and geopolitics of the region, “Technology”, No date, https://www.turkheritage.org/en/issues/technology)//nehahahah

As technology continues to evolve, with the rise of autonomous vehicles, the blockchain industry, and artificial intelligence, Turkey, NATO and others continue to invest heavily in global technological advancements. The global technological developments allow for various responses to geo-political issues, but also have the potential to add more nuance to international issues. The response to the rise in new and emerging technologies relies on international coordination and cooperation. Domestic advancement in Turkey, for instance, involves international issues and stakeholders. Turkey, the United States and NATO have continued to develop and manufacture technological devices for space, communications and vehicles. In fact, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoaña has emphasized the increasing significance of international cooperation on Artificial Intelligence (AI) “as the most pervasive emerging and disruptive technology, especially when combined with other technologies such as big data, autonomy or biotechnologies” (NATO, 2021). NATO uses the Science and Technology Organization (STO) to maintain modern technology advances for further development. The transatlantic collaboration amongst NATO Member-states allows for these advancements to reach their full potential in a world facing developing challenges.

Start-up businesses also reap the benefits of Turkey’s technological advancements. Internet companies such as Trendyol and Hepsiburada are becoming major players in the Turkish internet market, and have attracted attention from Silicon Valley in the U.S. Along with this, Turkey is the 20th largest market for eCommerce in 2020, and has attracted the attention of several American companies. In 2020, the centre joined the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (C41R) Network. In taking a more global approach, the goal of the center is to research the internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, and blockchain technology. Each of these are issues of focus for the U.S. as well.

It is clear that Turkey is contouring its policies and posturing itself to become a leading country in the field of digital revolution while the United States uses its continued advancements and investments to combat threats. Technological advancements made in Turkey highlight the role of trans-atlantic and global partnerships while international investments, with the United States for instance, enable a comprehensive understanding of the new and emerging challenges. Global cooperation is paramount in the sharing of new technological advancements when crises arise and the most efficient manner to respond to them. The universal elements of technology allow geo-politics and foriegn policy to thrive in efficiency; however, understanding the setbacks and stagnation in regions is equally important.

### US-Turkey Partnership

#### Alliance and cooperation with Turkey is key for NATO and U.S. deterrence strategies that is neccessary to fighting Advantage 1’s impacts

Eldridge 11 (William Eldridge, U.S. air force colonel and commander, former public policy scholar, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrence The Case of the Republic of Turkey,” Air University Press, September 2011, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wp\_0018\_eldridge\_extended\_nuclear\_deterrent.pdf)//nehahahah

This research suggests that it is the strength of the US-Turkish political-security relationship that is the most important factor for ensuring the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. In fact, the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella has little to do with the type of its nuclear weapons, the number of warheads, or the negative image of US nuclear competency generated from the Air Force’s nuclear handling missteps. Instead, US credibility depends on Turkey’s perception of its political, economic, and military ties with the United States. It is the quality of that broader relationship that will also have the greatest influence on whether or not Turkish leaders pursue an independent nuclear weapons capability. Turkey generally measures the strength of its security relationship with the United States through the lens of the reliability of bilateral and multilateral security and partnership agreements such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Although there are many ways to measure the strength of these types of relationships—domestic polls, media tone, treaties, and agreements— the perception of national leadership is the most important. It is the highest level of Turkish decision makers that will decide the merits of continued reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrent. Undoubtedly, domestic influence and external security threats influence those decision makers, but for Turkey, it is the perception of alliance strength that will have the most influence on its nuclear proliferation decisions.

### EU-NATO Coop

#### EU-NATO coop requires a strong Turkish partnership.

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/45246769/NATO\_-\_Europeum-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1656640561&Signature=NFfpJ926sWQwM5VX5~i-15bKcCKcEYNPWA93MEEDG5kfUMnEQXFXyCG0Ne~No4UkwI05XyBb3asU9vITvj3Qw3T5JShoyGJEqOfssm7FQC2k9RHHQMUvFySOx2xTtKv1C5YOUp9yEYcmBEVQQMWw9AqSXGLuZAuEDMbcVrIUIlqOKV6~88ZaQWN05eXldfp0GHfpUZpzRxgMQQEDCIA1UyGBNQQnDUeuABQFS9HFwE3okX92SFbQ2yjNkln3pxBf9zgYEeyDz0jWT-Ib3-vB-Liv5bGI2p4sFDo3EyTZzq4UgwXuWDT0rXXOaVcHb-9qyzCRfO1D9bB6jtuAoCpj4Q\_\_&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

Cyprus has been priority number one in Turkish foreign affairs for many years. The island has been a highly contentious issue for both Greece and Turkey, as well as for the international community. The tensions between the two countries have slowed down the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in its fullest sense. According to the North Atlantic Council decision of 2002 Cyprus and Malta are excluded from participating in EUNATO meetings concerning ‘strategic cooperation’ between the two sides of the Atlantic. However, the EU, based on the community solidarity principle, does not want to leave Cyprus out of this security dialogue. Turkey insists on the validity of the North Atlantic Council decision of 2002 and blocks the participation of Cyprus in the NATO-EU strategic cooperation, Cyprus blocks Turkish membership and participation in the EU decision making mechanisms concerning security in return. Given all these tensions, there is still no guarantee that once the Cyprus problem is resolved, the EU and NATO will automatically cooperate. All the attention is now on this mutual blockade and the Cyprus problem is often blamed for non-cooperation (Buharalı, 2008). The Cyprus problem has transcended regional bickering to become an international problem. It is a long lived debate and an agreement does not seem to be reached soon. One has to acknowledge that even if the Cyprus problem were solved today, many complications remain. The EU and the United States have different approaches to security that might make it difficult to work together. Furthermore Turkey is still only a candidate member, and would not be allowed in the EU decision making processes. The EU-NATO cooperation needs an active Turkish presence to be effective in the region. The different approaches of the EU and the US may be the biggest problem impeding the transatlantic security alliance in the future. The EU as a soft power does not use the same means as the hard power United States and vice-versa. The division of tasks between the EU and NATO has created yet another problem. 6 It would be much less costly and easier to overcome the problems in the conflict zones if the two could decide on who is doing what. For now, instead of waiting for the Cyprus problem to be solved, new grounds for cooperation have to be found.